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ELVIN R. LATTYt
RECENTLY there has been an attempt at legislation specially subjecting
"pseudo-foreign corporations" to certain provisions of local corporation law.'
This event invites a re-examination of the whole question of the application
of local law to corporations essentially local in character but incorporated in
a foreign state. Momentarily ignoring the criteria for determining when the
foreign corporation is essentially local in character, let us assume the clearest
case of localness: a business conducted entirely or predominantly within the
state by local residents. The prototype of the pseudo-foreign corporation can
well be the local hotel owned entirely by local residents but incorporated out
of state-say, in Delaware. The belief seems to prevail that the local corporation
law, aside from the part devoted expressly to foreign corporations and treating
mostly problems of admission and jurisdiction, has no application to foreign
corporations, however pseudo-foreign they may be. According to this view,
it is absurdly easy to avoid any uncongenial feature of local corporation law;
one can simply incorporate in a state where there is no such feature, and,
according to reputable authority, "it is no fraud or evasion of the laws of a
state for its citizens intending to act only in their own state to form themselves
into a corporation under the laws of another state."'2 Can it be that the law
is really so simple, and so blind?
It is submitted that the dogmatic treatment of all corporations chartered in
other states as foreign corporations exempt from local law neither should be
nor actually is the rule in practice. That a distinction should be made between
pseudo-foreign and truly foreign corporations will appear from an examination
of the possible theoretical justifications for treating the two alike. It is hoped
that this examination will also lay bare some of the underlying policy consider-
ations to be served by any rule dealing with the problem of foreign corpora-
tions. Then the actual judicial decisions will be examined, and it will be
shown that although these decisions seem superficially to support the con-
clusion that pseudo-foreign corporations are beyond the reach of local law,
tProfessor of Law, Duke University.
1. The General Statutes Commission of North Carolina submitted to the 1955 General
Assembly a proposed New Business Corporation Act. S. Bill No. 49, 1955 Sess. The Bill
defined "pseudo-foreign corporation" and made certain provisions of the local corporation
law applicable to such a corporation. The Bill was enacted, to become effective July 1, 1957,
but the provisions relating to "pseudo-foreign" corporations were eliminated. N.C. Sess.
Laws 1955, c. 1371.
2. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWs 775 (1935).
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they do not in reality go so far. They are, in fact, reconcilable with an ap-
proach that makes a distinction between pseudo-foreign corporations and the
genuinely foreign variety, even though that distinction has not yet been ex-
pressly delineated in the decisions themselves. Then, having seen that distinc-
tive treatment of pseudo-foreign corporations should be the rule, and could
be so far as case precedent is concerned, we shall look into the constitutional
aspects of the proposed rule, and finally examine the way that other countries
have dealt with the problem. First, let us explore the possible policy bases
of the traditional view, which is that a pseudo-foreign corporation is no
different from any other foreign corporation, and so must be governed by the
law of the state of its incorporation.
THE THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR GOVERNING A PSEUDO-FOREIGN
CORPORATION BY THE LAW OF THE CHARTERING STATE
1. The Charter as a Contract
One possible explanation for exempting pseudo-foreign corporations from
local law might be the view that a corporate charter is a contract, so that
ordinary conflicts choice-of-law rules for contracts must apply. Then the
validity of the contract is determined by the law of the place of execution
(which is, let us assume without argument, the incorporating state). Or the
validity and effect of the contract may be governed by the law of any reason-
ably related state selected by the parties, the state of incorporation being one
such reasonably related place, even if the only reason the contract was ex-
ecuted there was to seek the coverage of its law and the exclusion of other
law.
This explanation will not do. Aside from the theoretical difficulty of govern-
ing "outsiders" (e.g., creditors) by the charter contract, there is much more
to a corporation than a mere contract. There is no point in rehashing the
"franchise" or "grant" or "privilege" aspects of the corporate charter, nor in
discussing the nature of the legal personality of the entity that arises from in-
corporation. Suffice it to say that the corporate charter, though a contract, is
one that is sui generis, especially as relates to freedom of contract. This charter
freedom has never been left unbounded: specific provisions are often required
or forbidden, by courts as well as by legislatures. 3 Legislation relating to cor-
porations not infrequently contains protective provisions that the parties to be
protected cannot "waive" by contract in drafting the charter. For example, a
court would surely not uphold a charter clause to the effect that no share-
holders can inspect those books and records that the law otherwise entitles
them to inspect.4 It is not logical that local law be automatically excluded
simply because parties have, by selecting the place of incorporation, exercised
3. Indeed, freedom of contract has been denied, under corporation laws as interpreted
by the courts, where the parties involved were merely seeking reasonable business ar-
rangements. See Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945);
Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va. 327, 31 S.E.2d 893 (1944).
4. See State e.x rel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 34 Del. 81, 143 Atl. 257 (1926).
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freedom of contract on a matter that local law does not leave completely to
freedom of contract. And finally, even if one were to view the corporate
charter as a "mere contract," it is by no means clear that under the principles
of conflict of laws strong local public policy could be evaded by making the
contract in another state for the very purpose of circumventing local law.5
2. The Corporation as the "Creature" of the Chartering State
It might be argued that the out-of-reach view is an inescapable consequence
of the doctrine that the corporate person is created by the foreign state, and
that only the creator can give the entity the structure and the organs by which
it operates; it alone can prescribe the functioning, duties and responsibilities of
the organism and its parts.
True enough, corporation law has had a flair for getting entangled in legal
mysticism, probably because of the metaphysical vistas opened by the concepts
of corporation and personality. But we have had enough troubles in corpora-
tion law with reasoning based on the concept of corporations as creatures of the
sovereign 6 without pushing this highly nonfunctional dogma into new territory.
Anyway, the argument proves too much in the light of existing law: witness the
application (by statute) of the former California rule of shareholders' super-
added liability even to other states' corporate creatures doing business in Cali-
fornia and there incurring debts.7 Furthermore, the "creation" dogma can be met
with an argument of the same breed: it is equally plausible to maintain that
in the case of the pseudo-foreign corporation the creature's structure and organs
are transformed by the power of the new superimposed local sovereign, so as
to take on some of the same functions, duties and responsibilities of local
creatures. Obviously this quasi-theology gets us nowhere.
3. Certainty and Ease of Application
The exclusive supremacy of the law of the state of incorporation may be
suggested as the only rule of certainty and easy application. It cannot be
5. Personal Finance Co. v. Gilinsky Fruit Co., 127 Neb. 450, 256 N.W. 511 (1934)
(loan and assignment of local wages made out-of-state) ; London Finance Co. v. Shattuck,
221 N.Y. 702, 117 N.E. 1075 (1917) (local lender had loan applications sent out of state
for acceptance). See also King v. Bruce, 145 Tex. 647, 201 S.W.2d 803 (1947) (elaborate
out-of-state transaction to change community property into separate property). In all
these cases, the out-of-state evasive scheme did not work.
6. One recalls the difficulties persisting to this day in suits against foreign corpor-
ations from the doctrines and fictions that were developed to circumvent the dicta of
Chief Justice Taney in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839), to the
effect that a corporation cannot exist outside the state of its creation, that a corporation
cannot migrate. Id. at 586-90. See HENDERSON, THE PosITIoN OF FOREIGN COa'ORATIONS
IN AmErIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW cc. 3, 5 (1918). Similarly, viewing a corporation
as a "creature of the law" has contributed to the difficulties of the ultra vires doctrine.
See Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U.S. 24 (1891). Perhaps
judicial conservatism in failing to "disregard the corporate entity" can also be partly
attributed to the creation theory.
7. Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U.S. 221 (1914); Penney v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 144
(1901). See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 191 (1934).
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denied that the rule has these qualities-nor that any other rule runs into diffi-
culties of interpretation and application. Take, for example, a possible alterna-
tive rule: that the governing law of a pseudo-foreign corporation should be the
local corporation law. Obviously not all of that law would be intended to
apply-not, for instance, the purely procedural formalities of incorporating.8
But if not all of the local law, then what parts? Even if the question is not
insoluble, it runs into the familiar difficulties that arise when a juridical line
is to be drawn. Likewise, there is the thorny problem of determining when a
corporation is pseudo-foreign. None of these troubles is presented by the tradi-
tional view. Even more clearly than in the case of an individual, we know with
certainty where the corporate creature was born and who created it.9
Even admitting that certainty and ease of application are highly desirable
features in legal principles, however, there remains the question how big
a price we want to pay for certainty when a rule giving us certainty leads to
undesirable results. We have had the same problem with the doctrine that
a corporation is a "separate entity" from its stockholders. The doctrine is
easy, certain-almost beautiful; but literally applied, it gives results that are
sometimes ludicrously unrealistic. And so an antidote has been worked out:
the separate entity will be disregarded when necessary to avoid an undesirable
result.' 0 Thus if a corporation is too "thinly" capitalized the enterpriser may
find that he has lost his limited liability or at least his pretended creditor
status." This is clearly a departure from certainty and a venture into deter-
mining how thin is too thin. The sensible solution in dealing with the separate
entity, and with the pseudo-foreign corporation as well, is to stick to the
certain rule until-but only until-there are strong policy reasons for doing
otherwise.
4. The Difficulty of Matching Local Law to Foreign Charters
Is choice of the incorporating state's law dictated, even in the case of the
pseudo-foreign corporation, by the impossibility of applying local law to a
structure whose gears won't mesh with local law? One can think of awkward
situations arising if local corporation law were applied to a foreign corporation.
For example, if the local statute were construed to mean that in a certain class
of shares entitled to vote on a particular matter each share shall be entitled to
one vote (or to not more than one vote),12 its application to a foreign corpora-
tion's balanced voting scheme (e.g., with voting rights geared to the amounts of
capital contributions) might be most disturbing. Again, if local laws provide
8. Cf. Demarest v. Flack, 128 N.Y. 205, 28 N.E. 645 (1891).
9. This isn't true in the case of the multiple-incorporated enterprise. Sce Foley,
Multiple Incorporation and the Conflict of Laws, 42 HARv. L. REv. 516 (1929).
10. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 292-93 (rev. ed. 1946); SThVENS, CORPORATIONS 85-95
(2d ed. 1949).
11. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 302-03 (rev. ed. 1946); LA=Tr, SU3SIDIARIES AND
AFFIILIATED CORPORATIONS cc. 5, 6 (1936) ; STEvENs, CORPORATIONS 85-95 (2d ed. 1949).
12. Query whether the MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION AcT § 31 (1953 Draft) is
susceptible of this interpretation.
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that the initial by-laws must be adopted by the first board of directors, whereas
in the state of incorporation by-laws are adopted by the subscribers (share-
holders) before election of the first board of directors, one might be somewhat
uncertain about how to apply the local law.
The argument proves no more than that if local law were to be applied it
would have to be applied on a selective basis. The selection might well be limited
to those protective features of local law that indicate a fairly strong policy of
safeguarding the particular local interests in question (creditors, stockholders).
If local law, for example, imposes liability on directors of local corporations for
paying dividends when the resulting ratio of assets to liabilities is reduced below
three-to-two,' 3 the application of that feature of local law to a pseudo-foreign
corporation would protect local interests with which the local state is legitimately
concerned. It could be imposed without technical difficulty as an additional re-
striction on dividends beyond those imposed by the state of incorporation. One
could go that far with the pseudo-foreign corporation without having to contend
that a real foreign corporation is, absent express local statutes, subject to divi-
dend restrictions other than those imposed by the law of the chartering state.
A fortiori, such a choice-of-law principle would not subject nationally operating
corporations-"cosmopolites"-to the varying dividend laws of the many states
in which they operate.' 4
5. Outright Conflict Between Local and Foreign Law
Similar to the point just discussed is the argument that adherence to the
incorporating state's law is justified as an effort to avoid the possibility of an
impasse when the courts of the local state make a requirement directly opposed
to one made by the other state. In such a case management wouldn't know what
to do. Suppose that there are 100,000 common shares and 40,000 preferred
shares entitled to vote on a recapitalization by charter amendment, and 55,000
of common and 18,000 of preferred voted for the amendment. Suppose further
that in the incorporating state a majority of all the shares, bunched as a unit,
can adopt the amendment, whereas in the local state it would take a majority of
each class. It is conceivable that after the amendment became duly effective by
the law of the state of incorporation the court of the local state might order the
corporation to treat the shares as unchanged, while the court of the other state
would decree exactly the opposite.
It is doubtful, however, that this possibility of conflict justifies complete ex-
clusion of local law despite the local character of the enterprise. For one thing,
the matter is not left entirely to the rival mercies of the two state courts; the
United States Supreme Court has the role of determining which court, or
which law, must give way. Furthermore, unless the two state laws are
totally incompatible, such deadlocks are matters within the insiders' control,
since by appropriate charter clauses even corporations in the less exacting juris-
13. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. ST.T. § 55-116 (1950).
14. For rationalizing the choice of the incorporating state's law in such a case, see
Coleman, Corporate Dividends and the Conflict of Laws, 63 HARv. L. REv. 433 (1950).
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dictions can usually adopt higher requirements. And in matters where a clear
local policy of a protective nature can be discerned, the charter sponsors might
well be required, if they want to avoid the impasse, to draft their charter
accordingly. The only burden this would create would be that of studying the
statutes of both states before resorting to a pseudo-foreign corporation.
6. Antiquated Local Laws
The traditional view might be supported by a policy of allowing a corporation
to choose to operate under an up-to-date body of corporate law-one that is
complete, and technically abreast of legitimate business needs and modern financ-
ing techniques-where the local law is obsolete. But it is one thing to permit
a corporation to avoid archaic provisions of local law 15 (which would probably
not express a vigorous public policy in any event), and quite another to allow
it to avoid a strong local policy, of which only the local courts and legislature
should be the judges. And at any rate this argument should not appeal to a
court of, say, California or Ohio, both of which states make a constant effort
to improve their corporation laws and keep them geared to legitimate business
needs. The most plausible reason for Californians or Ohioans organizing a
Delaware corporation to do a predominantly California or Ohio business is,
presumably, simply to evade the local corporation law.
7. Lack of a Local Policy
The rule of immunity of foreign corporations from local regulation as repeated
by some state courts may be traceable to a view that the local corporation laws
do not really embody any provisions of firm public policy that might not just
as well be supplanted by the corresponding provision of the foreign law. True,
many corporation statutes have become largely enabling rather than regulatory
acts. That is, they go to great length and detail in clarifying the operation of the
various corporate organs and in spelling out exactly how to go about effecting
all those varied transactions in which a corporation may find itself, without
seriously curtailing the corporation's freedom of action in the interest of com-
munity welfare. 16 Conceivably, then, a court in a state having a mere enabling
15. Until recently, good examples of such archaic provisions were to be found in the
corporation laws of the District of Columbia and Texas.
16. Of course no corporation act can really avoid making some "regulatory" choices,
no matter how much of a mere "enabling act" the draftsman was striving for. One ndver
sees, for instance, a statutory dividend provision that reads, "Dividends shall be payable
from such sources, irrespective of the financial condition of the corporation, as the charter
may provide," or a comparable provision for other returns of corporate property to
shareholders. A completely logical theory of free bargaining would urge that such a
provision would be perfectly sound, since creditors, before extending credit, can always
look to see how protective or unprotective to creditors is the charter of this particular
corporation. Even the favorite incorporation states embody a minimum of protection to
creditors and shareholders: Delaware, for instance, forbids loans to officers and directors,
gives even non-voting shares a vote on fundamental matters, and requires a class vote
on some of these matters.
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act for its corporation law might see little point to holding pseudo-foreign cor-
porations to any local rule. But such an attitude would not be justified under
a local corporation law that contains carefully worked out protective features.
8. Local Policy Improper
Finally, someone may urge that local legislatures have no business seeking to
safeguard particular interests (creditors, shareholders in general, minority share-
holders or particular classes of shareholders) by protective provisions that go
beyond the minimal protection afforded by other states. The argument collapses
of its own weight, and yet it would seem to be the only possible explanation of
judicial decisions that would hold that provisions carefully inserted in the local
corporation law with a serious protective purpose can, no matter how purely
local is the enterprise, be evaded by the simple device of foreign incorporation.
There is, in sum, no cogent reason why vigorous community policies ex-
pressed in particular portions of a modern corporation law should not outweigh
considerations of mere certainty and ease of application. There is no justifica-
tion for immunizing an essentially local corporation from such policy-laden local
law simply because the corporation was chartered in another state. It remains
to be seen whether the law is as it clearly should be.
CAsES APPARENTLY EXCLUDING LOCAL LAW
Turning from discussion of theory and policy to an examination of the cases,
one finds that the hegemony of the law of the chartering state over a pseudo-
foreign corporation is by no means as clear as a hurried reading would indicate.
The cases that seem at first glance to look to the law of the state of incorporation
as the exclusive governing law can be grouped into three categories in terms
of the specific issues dealt with: (1) the cases where the question was whether
the local court could take jurisdiction of a suit involving the "internal affairs"
of a corporation chartered in a foreign state; (2) those presenting the broad
issue of valid corporate existence; and (3) those turning on the specific question
whether the incorporating state's law should apply.
Jurisdiction of the Local Court over a Foreign Corporation
There are a group of cases that purport to follow the doctrine that except
where there is fraud, or possibly mismanagement, a local court will not interfere
with the "internal affairs" of foreign corporations,' 7 and will not exercise
"visitorial power" (whatever that means)' 8 over such corporations. These
17. 17 FCHER, CYCLOPEDIA PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8425 (perm. ed. 1933); RE-
STATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 196-97, 199 (1934).
18. On the emptiness of that resounding phrase "visitorial power" or "visitatorial
power," see State ex rel. Weede v. Iowa So. Util. Co., 231 Iowa 784, 813-16, 2 N.W.2d
372, 388-90 (1942).
19551
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
cases have been a fertile source of statements that, by the cumulative effect of
sheer repetition, have given foreign corporations an aura of immunity to local
laws relating to the internal affairs of corporations.
If the internal affairs doctrine were really strictly followed 19 it would be
a standing invitation to circumvent all provisions in the local corporation law
that regulate internal matters (which would include most matters touching the
interests of stockholders and creditors), however strong the policy behind the
provisions might be. Then the only courts that could take jurisdiction of an
internal affairs case would be those of the state of creation; and those courts,
we can safely assume, would apply their own law governing the particular in-
ternal affair without regard to the law of the state with which the corporation is
wholly identified in reality, unless and until the United States Supreme Court
were to require them to do otherwise. For example, if by the corporation's
charter and the law of the state of creation voting for directors is "straight,"
whereas the local state has a strong statutory policy favoring cumulative voting,
then the locally operating pseudo-foreign corporation could, by the internal
affairs doctrine, escape the local law: the local court would not look into the
challenged election, and the court of the state of creation would, presumably,
count the ballots "straight."
Actually, the internal affairs doctrine should be viewed as a mere misnomer
for forum non conveniens.2 0 If frankly recognized as a problem of balance of
convenience, and not a slot-machine matter, the question whether the local court
should hear cases involving even internal matters would seem to be an easy
one where the corporation in question is pseudo-foreign. Be that as it may, one
finds that even working within the formula of the internal affairs doctrine, courts
make a sharp distinction when it comes to corporations whose business and
personnel are predominantly identified with the local state, as shown by such
factors as the places where the business is done, the location of property and
records, and the location of the residence and meetings of directors.21 Courts
have little difficulty in entertaining internal affairs suits in such cases, even to
the extent of removing the wrongdoing officers of a pseudo-foreign corporation,22
or appointing receivers, liquidating or otherwise.2 3  If in most of these
19. For a critical appraisal of the internal affairs doctrine, see Notes, 46 COLUM. L.
RPv. 413 (1946), 33 id. at 492 (1933), 97 U. PA. L. Ra,. 666 (1949). See also State
ex rel. Weede v. Iowa So. Util. Co., supra note 18.
20. See Williams v. Green Bay & W. Ry., 326 U.S. 549 (1946) ; State ex rel. Weede
v. Iowa So. Util. Co., 231 Iowa 784, 818-27, 2 N.W.2d 372, 391-95 (1942); Notes cited
note 19 supra.
21. See cases cited in 17 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 17, § 8427, and in State ex rel.
Weede v. Iowa So. Util. Co., supra note 20. See also RESTATEMENT, Co"micr OF LAWS
§ 197 (1937).
22. State ex rel. Wurdeman v. Reynolds, 275 Mo. 113, 204 S.W. 1093 (1918). The
court distinguished a prior case on the ground that it had not involved such a completely
local enterprise.
23. Aston v. O'Carroll, 66 F. Supp. 585 (M.D. Pa. 1946); Potter v. Victor Page
Motors Corp., 300 Fed. 885 (D. Conn. 1924) ; Scholl v. Allen, 237 Ky. 716, 36 S.W.2d
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cases the local courts nevertheless applied the law of the state of creation, at
least they had hurdled the barrier of jurisdiction. Perhaps their actual choice of
law was correct in terms of the principles we will discuss shortly.
Validity of Corporate Existence
There are a group of cases wherein one litigant urged that the validity or ex-
istence of the foreign corporation should be denied on the ground that the enter-
prise was entirely local in every aspect and was incorporated in another
state simply to take advantage of the corporation law of that state. The
courts have almost invariably denied the contention,24 generally in unnecessarily
broad language suggesting that pseudo-foreign incorporation will be recognized
for all purposes.
The leading case is Demarest v. Flack,2 1 where a group of New Yorkers, hav-
ing formed a West Virginia corporation 26 to own and operate an amusement
park in New York City, were personally sued in New York by a customer who
was injured while using the corporation's facilities. Recovery was denied. The
validity and existence of the foreign corporation must be "recognized," said the
court, in an opinion which on the surface seems to give approval to resort to
pseudo-foreign corporations:
"If in any particular case it is thought by those interested in the matter
that the business can be done in our own state and by our own citizens with
greater facility under the form of a foreign corporation than under that of a
353 (1931); Starr v. Bankers Union, 81 Neb. 377, 116 N.W. 61 (1908); Hogeland v.
Tec-Crafts, Inc., 39 Pa. County Ct. 10 (Del. C.P. 1951).
A fortiori local courts will appoint a custodial receiver. Scattergood v. American
Pipe & Constr. Co., 249 Fed. 23 (3d Cir. 1918) ; Fudickar v. Louisiana Loan & Inv. Co.,
13 F.2d 920 (W.D. La. 1926); Hill v. Dealers Credit Corp., 102 N.J. Eq. 310, 140 AtI.
569 (Ch. 1928).
24. An early New Jersey case disregarded the corporate entity and treated the share-
holders of the foreign corporation as partners where the court believed that the corpora-
tion should have been chartered under local law for the local business it was conducting.
Hill v. Beach, 12 N.J. Eq. 31 (Ch. 1858). Coming from a New Jersey court, the following
ex.cerpt from the opinion is today not without humor:
"[Tlhe Belleville Quarry Company [incorporated in New York to own and operate
a quarry in New Jersey) cannot be recognized by any court in New Jersey as a
legally constituted corporation. If it can, what need is there of any general or
special law in our state? Individuals ... may go into the city of New York, organ-
ize under the general laws of that state, erect all manufacturing establishments
here, and ... transact their business, not only free from all personal responsibility,
but under cover of a corporation not amenable to our laws. ... These individuals,
then, must be treated and dealt with by the law as partners ..
Id. at 35-36.
25. 128 N.Y. 205,28 N.E. 645 (1891).
26. In the period 1884-1901, West Virginia apparently was a favorite incorporating
state. 2 CooK, STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS § 935 (3d ed. 1894); CONYXGTON & BENNETr,
COROATION PROCEDURE 712 (rev. ed. 1927). The reasons were low rates and simple
requirements. In 1901, that state raised and complicated the fees and taxes, from an
"ill-judged avarice," whereupon it lost its incorporating business. Ibid.
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domestic one, there is no public policy which forbids the transaction under
such form."2 7
To repeat, on the surface these words seem to approve of the institution of
the pseudo-foreign corporation. Actually, no feature of New York law pro-
tective of the plaintiff's class was shown to be evaded. There was, so far as
appears, nothing in New York law that would have assured corporate creditors
of a more solvent corporation or of a remedy against anyone but the corpora-
tion, even if the enterprise had been incorporated under New York law. The
court itself made the point: "The freedom from personal liability would be as
great, and could as easily be attained, under our own as under the laws of West
Virginia," and so there was "really nothing to evade by incorporating under a
foreign law," 28 at least insofar as the plaintiff was concerned. If by resorting
to a West Virginia corporation the enterprisers circumvented New York taxes
and fees, that is no concern of creditors (indeed, this plaintiff may be all the
better off for it!). On the other hand, if New York legislation had revealed a
policy of holding shareholders in New York corporations liable without limit
to tort claimants suffering personal injuries from corporate operations within
the state, the result might have been different.29 The case stands only for the
proposition that the penalty for that evasion of local corporation law is not
denial of limited liability of the shareholders. It does not hold that a pseudo-
foreign corporation is an effective evasion device against any and all features
of local corporation law.
Demrest v. Flack is typical of the many cases that "recognize" the foreign
corporation with words of approval comforting to the pseudo-foreign corpora-
tion. In those cases, as in Demarest v. Flack, the actual decisions were perfectly
sound inasmuch as no local policy was frustrated by the recognition of a
foreign charter. A sampling of such cases would include those holding that
such a foreign corporation has capacity to sue in the local state 30 (whether
to enforce a subscription to its stock,31 to enforce other contracts 32 or to pro-
tect its property or other interests) ;33 can convey good title to local lands ;34
27. Demarest v. Flack, 128 N.Y. 205, 217, 28 N.E. 645, 649 (1891). The earlier
New York case of Merrick v. Van Santvoord, 34 N.Y. 208 (1866), recognized the validity
of the Connecticut charter of a locally operating corporation, but the incorporators
(not shown to be mere dummies) were Connecticut citizens.
28. Demarest v. Flack, 128 N.Y. 205, 216, 28 N.E. 645, 648 (1891).
29. True, it has been held that N.Y. STocK CoRe. LAW § 71, making shareholders liable
for debts due to laborers, servants or employees of the corporation, does not apply to
foreign corporations. Armstrong v. Dyer, 268 N.Y. 671, 198 N.E. 551 (1935) ; Gonzalez
v. Tuttman, 59 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (collecting citations). Contra, Greenberg
v. Rosenwasser, 147 Misc. 757, 264 N.Y. Supp. 529 (1st Dep't 1933). But it is not at
all clear that these cases involved an out-and-out pseudo-foreign corporation.
30. Troy & N.C. Gold Mining Co. v. Snow Lumber Co., 173 N.C. 593, 92 S.E. 494
(1917).
31. Philadelphia & Gulf S.S. Co. v. Soeffing, 59 Pa. Super. 429 (1915).
32. Oakdale Mfg. Co. v. Garst, 18 R.I. 484, 28 Atl. 973 (1894).
33. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisville Home Tel. Co., 114 Ky. 892, 72 S.W.
4 (1903).
34. Lancaster v. Amsterdam Improvement Co., 140 N.Y. 576, 35 N.E. 964 (1894).
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can by mandamus force the appropriate local state official to grant it a permit
to do business locally even if the corporation's stock structure or organizational
steps are not such as would be appropriate for a local corporation 35 (even if
it was incorporated out of state by local citizens and is seeking admission into
the state in the face of a local statute that forbids the admission of foreign cor-
porations formed for "the purpose of evading our laws") ;36 is entitled to ex-
ercise and retain its public utility franchise, despite the contention that the
corporation was formed in another state solely to do business in this state ;3
and does not subject its shareholders to the unlimited personal liability of
partners.38
In all the foregoing cases "recognizing" the foreign corporation one finds no
words of disapproval of pseudo-foreign corporations. 9 But those cases merely
hold that such corporations are not "nullities," and are not "prevented from
acting" in the local state.4 0 Such holdings would not compel a local court to
35. Commonwealth Acceptance Corp. v. Jordan, 198 Cal. 618, 246 Pac. 796 (1926);
North Am. Petroleum Co. v. Hopkins, 105 Kan. 161, 181 Pac. 625 (1919) ; State ex rel.
Standard Tank Car Co. v. Sullivan, 282 Mo. 261, 221 S.W. 728 (1920); State ex rel.
Fiberboard Products, Inc. v. Hinkle, 147 Wash. 10, 264 Pac. 1010 (1928) (foreign
corporation with different classes of common stock-a scheme not contemplated by local
law). It does not appear whether these foreign corporations were pseudo-foreign or
simply cosmopolites. For the issue there involved, it should not matter. In the California
case the court recognized that the question of equality of voting power among the shares, then
required in California corporations, was not involved in this action of mandamus for
admittance to do business as a foreign corporation. Commonwealth Acceptance Corp.
v. Jordan, supra at 630, 246 Pac. at 801. The Kansas and Missouri cases involved ad-
mittance of corporations having no-par shares into states that had not yet got around
to passing no-par statutes. Expressions in some of the opinions in the foregoing cases
to the effect that stock structure is a matter of "internal affairs," and that the local court
will not look into the internal affairs of a foreign corporation, are to be understood in
the light of what the court was actually deciding; i.e., to let the corporation in. Nothing
more was involved.
36. State cx rel. Brown Contracting & Bldg. Co. v. Cook, 181 Mo. 596, 603, 80 S.W.
929, 930 (1904). As the court apparently construed the statute, the laws of Missouri
were not being avoided unless the foreign corporation was formed for a purpose not
authorized by Missouri law.
37. State cx reL. Godard v. Topeka Water Co., 61 Kan. 547, 60 Pac. 337 (1900). The
court construed the charter to authorize this New Jersey corporation to do business
also in New Jersey, thus avoiding the doctrine of Land Grant Ry. & T. Co. v. Coffey
County, 6 Kan. 245 (1870), to the effect that a corporation whose charter does not
authorize it to operate at home will not, on any principle of comity, be recognized in
another state, and hence cannot there maintain suit.
38. Beal v. Childress, 92 Kan. 109, 139 Pac. 1198 (1914); Merrick v. Van Santvoord,
34 N.Y. 208 (1866). Contra, Hill v. Beach, 12 N.J. Eq. 31 (Ch. 1858), discussed in note 24
supra.
39. "Indeed, the practice, whether good or evil, of taking out charters in one state
with which to do business solely in others is too general and has been too long recognized
to be now questioned." Troy & N.C. Gold Mining Co. v. Snow Lumber Co., 173 N.C.
593, 594, 92 S.E. 494, 495 (1917).
40. 2 BErALE, CoNFLICT or LAws 775 (1935). It is significant that Beale's statement
that it is no fraud or evasion of the law to incorporate elsewhere, see text at note 2 supra,
was directed at this question of nullity resulting from such incorporation.
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refuse to apply the local statute concerning, say, cumulative voting, to a pseudo-
foreign corporation.
Application of a Specific Rule of the Incorporating State
The cases are many where local courts have applied a specific rule of the
chartering state to a foreign corporation, with either an implicit assumption
or an explicit generalization to the effect that of course that law is to be
applied. The cases extend over a vast range of topics, among them liability for
allegedly illegal dividends ;41 liability of shareholders for further payments ;-'-
the validity of a stock option plan ;43 election or appointment of officers ;4.
legality of loans to officers ;45 validity of a corporation's contract to repurchase
its shares ;46 corporation's lien on shares for shareholder's debt ;47 validity and
revocability of a pre-incorporation subscription to shares ;48 validity of transfer
of shares ;49 validity of a voting trust ;50 suit by a dissolved corporation in the
absence of statute authorizing such suit ;51 and ability of a dissolved corpora-
tion to assign contracts.52 Again, as in that group of cases recognizing the
"validity" of a pseudo-foreign corporation, the courts frequently talk broadly
of the governing law of the state of incorporation. For example, in one of the
cases relating to the validity of an agreement to appoint officers, arguably
41. National Lock Co. v. Hogland, 101 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1938); Rockwood v.
Foshay, 66 F.2d 625 (8th Cir. 1933) ; Abercrombie v. United Light and Power Co., 7 1'.
Supp. 530 (D. Md. 1934) ; Stratton v. Anderson, 278 Mich. 499, 270 N.W. 764 (1936) ;
Garetson Lumber Co. v. Hinson, 69 Ore. 605, 140 Pac. 633 (1914) ; Morris v. Sampsel,
224 Wis. 560, 272 N.W. 53 (1937); cf. Hamilton v. United Laundries Corp., 111 N.J.
Eq. 78, 161 AtI. 347 (Ch. 1932). See Coleman, supra note 14. Occasionally 1,cad law is
applied without discussion: Smalley v. Bernstein, 165 La. 1, 115 So. 347 (1927) ; Loan
Soc'y v. Eavenson, 248 Pa. 407, 94 Ati. 121 (1915).
42. Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912) (assessment). See also Broderick v.
Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935) ; cf. Cochrane v. Morris, 10 N.J. Misc. 82, 157 At. 652
(Sup. Ct. 1931); Southworth v. Morgan, 205 N.Y. 293, 98 N.E. 490 (1912).
43. See Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 133-50 (1933) (dissenting
opinion of Justice Stone). This was the only opinion on the merits. The majority opinion
held that it was proper to dismiss the complaint on the basis of the internal affairs
doctrine.
44. Cf. San Remo Copper Mining Co. v. Moneuse, 149 App. Div. 26, 133 N.Y. Supp.
509 (lst Dep't 1912).
45. National Lock Co. v. Hogland, 101 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1938). But cf. Bigelow
v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 74 N.J. ,Eq. 457, 71 Atl. 153 (Ch. 1908)
(local law applied as to liability of promotors for secret profits).
46. Tolman v. New Mexico & Dakota Mica Co., 4 Dak. 4, 22 N.W. 505 (1885);
Peterson v. New England Furniture & Carpet Co., 210 Minn. 449, 299 N.W. 208 (1941).
47. Bishop v. Globe Co., 135 Mass. 132 (1883).
48. Collins v. Morgan Grain Co., 16 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1926).
49. Hunt v. Drug, Inc., 35 Del. 332, 156 At. 384 (1931).
50. Ringling v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 29 Del. Ch.
318, 49 A.2d 603 (Ch. 1946), modified on rehearing, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (Sup.
Ct. 1947).
51. Fidelity Metals Corp. v. Risley, 77 Cal. App. 2d 377, 175 P.2d 592 (1946).
52. Kratky v. Andrews, 224 Minn. 386, 28 N.W.2d 624 (1947).
[Vol. 65 :137
PSEUDO-FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
invalid by local law, the court observed that "the plaintiff is a West Virginia
corporation, and controlled so far as its internal management is concerned by
the statutes of that state."' 3
These cases do not, however, establish an inescapable doctrine that the
local court must apply the foreign corporation law without taking into account
such factors as the essentially local character of the enterprise, the predomi-
nance of local residents among the interests protected by a particular feature of
local corporation law, or the vigor of the policy supporting that feature. The
actual decisions are reconcilable with an analysis that weighs such factors
against the traditional rule's certainty and ease of application. The cases that
appear to enunciate the rigid rule of looking to the law of incorporation can,
I believe, be seen to fall into one or more of the following categories:
1. The foreign corporation in question may not have been doing all or
even the major part of its business locally. In other words, the court was
simply announcing a general rule applicable to real foreign corporations, not
pseudo-foreign ones.54
2. There was no need to apply local corporation law in view of the absence
-f those interests with whose protection local law legitimately has a high con-
cern.' For example, no matter how otherwise localized a foreign corporation or
its business may be, if a majority of the shares are held by non-residents there
is no point to applying the local corporation law that all shareholders are en-
titled to vote,", at least in the absence of a showing that citizens of the local
state are bearing the brunt of the voting discrimination permitted under an
out-of-state charter. There is no particular reason in such a case for the local
state to make the voting rights its business.
3. No showing was made that there was any basic difference between the
laws of the two states.5 7
4. The application of the law of the state of incorporation would not run
counter to any strong policy of local corporation law.05 This would certainly
53. San Remo Copper Mining Co. v. Moneuse, 149 App. Div. 26, 28, 133 N.Y. Supp.
509, 511 (1st Dep't 1912).
54. Many of the cases cited in notes 41-52 supra may well have been of this kind,
but the reports do not reveal the fact. One knows, for example, that the American Tobacco
Company, an out-of-state corporation involved in litigation over a stock option plan in
the federal courts in New York in Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 133 (1933),
can by no stretch of imagination be said to be so essentially a New York corporatioh
that in that jurisdiction it must be viewed as pseudo-foreign.
55. Compare Stark Bros. Nurseries & Orchards Co. v. Little, 257 Fed. 421 (7th Cir.
1919) (Montana filing requirement wfith penalty of directors' liability to creditors for its
violation held inapplicable to a foreign corporation; creditor-plaintiff a Missouri concern)
with Nelson v. Bank of Fergus County, 157 Fed. 161 (8th Cir. 1907) (same Montana
statute applicable to a foreign corporation; local creditor involved).
56. Allen v. Montana Refining Co., 71 Mont. 105, 227 Pac. 582 (1924).
57. See, e.g., Stratton v. Anderson, 278 Mich. 499, 270 N.W. 764 (1936) ; Hamilton
v. United Laundries Corp., 111 N.J. Eq. 78, 161 AtI. 347 (Ch. 1932) ; Garetson Lumber Co.
v. Hinson, 69 Ore. 605, 140 Pac. 633 (1914).
58. See Groesbeck v. Beaupre, 307 I1. App. 215, 30 N.E.2d 531 (1940) (suit to en-
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be the case where the foreign state's protective measures are more stringent
than the local ones. For example, it is hard to show that any local policy,
much less a strong one, is violated by application of the law of the state of
incorporation that forbids loans by a corporation to its officers5 9 or that forbids
a corporation to buy its own shares. 60 True, the local state may permit local
corporations to engage in such transactions, but not for vital policy reasons.
5. Application of any law other than that of the state of incorporation
would, in view of the particular facts of the case, be impracticable 61 or in-
equitable.6"
All of these holdings may be summarized by saying that the courts looked
first to the law of the state of incorporation and, finding no particular local
policies substantial enough to overbalance the convenience of applying the
foreign law, applied it.
CAsEs APPLYING LOCAL LAW
Not all the cases treat pseudo-foreign corporations as truly foreign, of
course: there are a formidable number of cases applying local law to such
corporations. But just as the decisions we have just been discussing tend to
be couched in misleading, overgeneralized terms, the decisions choosing local
law, even though they are generally sound, use a variety of verbal formulae
equally generalized and uninformative.
There are a group of cases turning on the question of the "situs" of an
essentially localized corporation, allowing local garnishment of shares held
by a defendant in such a corporation 63 or of a debt owed by such a corpora-
tion.64 One encounters in such cases judicial expressions that the corporation
in question "was born, it is true, in New Jersey, but it lives, moves and has
its being in this state" ;65 or is only "nominally a corporation of the other
force superadded liability of shareholder) ; Edwards v. Schillinger, 245 Ill. 231, 91 N.E.
1048 (1910) (local enforcement of stock subscription fictitiously paid up by means of a
dividend when the corporation was insolvent) ; Young v. Farwell, 139 Ill. 326, 28 N.E.
845 (1891) (local enforcement of superadded shareholders' liability under law of state of
incorporation refused, out of further deference to that law) ; Peterson v. New England
Furniture & Carpet Co., 210 Minn. 449, 299 N.W. 208 (1941) (shareholder's suit to
compel corporation to purchase his share, contrary to a charter provision which appar-
ently would have been equally lawful by local corporation law).
59. National Lock Co. v. Hogland, 101 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1938).
60. Tolman v. New Mexico & Dakota Mica Co., 4 Dak. 4, 22 N.W. 505 (1885).
61. Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912) (suit by receiver to enforce liablity
of shareholders under the law of the state incorporation).
62. Young v. Farwell, 139 Il. 326, 28 N.E. 845 (1891). This suit by a creditor to
enforce liability of local shareholders under local law was dismissed because the courts of
the incorporating state had not determined the extent of liability for corporate debts of
shareholders in that state.
63. Wait v. Kern River Mining & Development Co., 157 Cal. 16, 106 Pac. 98 (1909);
Young v. South Tredegar Iron Co., 85 Tenn. 189, 2 S.W. 202 (1886).
64. Goodwin v. Claytor, 137 N.C. 176, 49 S.E. 173 (1904).
65. Id. at 183, 49 S.E. at 176.
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state" ;06 or that "its residence . . . anywhere else outside of California is the
merest fiction."'6 7 Relying on such cases, a New York court did not even
mention New Jersey in passing upon the legality of the removal of an officer
of a corporation chartered in New Jersey but predominantly identified with
New York.68
Another series of cases find the law of the chartering state inapplicable
on the ground that it is contrary to local public policy-although for the most
part they involve a public policy of a now outmoded sort. For example, at a
time when local policy did not grant the incorporation privilege readily but
instead required a special act of the legislature, thus subjecting the proposed
financing to an initial screening, a New Jersey court held that this policy could
not be evaded by forming a New York corporation under the New York
general incorporation law to own and operate a quarry in New Jersey.69
Likewise, at a time when local legislative policy did not extend the limited
liability corporate privilege to an enterprise conducting a general merchandis-
ing business, the formation of an out-of-state corporation to operate a purely
local business of that type was viewed as a "fraud upon the law" of both the
incorporating state and the local state, and the associates were held personally
liable as partners.1 0 The legislative background of this case is now archaic,
but the decision itself is not eccentric if viewed as holding not that an evasive
pseudo-foreign corporation should be "disregarded," but rather that certain
features of local law are so important that a local court will apply them at
least to the pseudo-foreign corporation.
Similarly, if local corporation law throws around the limited liability achieved
by incorporation certain safeguards for the protection of creditors, the local
courts may refuse to see those safeguards evaded by the pseudo-foreign cor-
poration device, at least if the judiciary sets high store by the safeguards. At
one time, for example, Missouri, like many other states, required that all of
the authorized capital stock be subscribed and that half of it be paid in before
the corporation could be organized. 71 When a group of Missouri residents
66. Ibid.
67. Wait v. Kern River Mining & Development Co., 157 Cal. 16, 21, 106 Pac. 98,
100 (1909).
68. McQuade v. Stoneham, 230 App. Div. 57, 242 N.Y. Supp. 548 (1st Dep't 1930),
rcv'd on other grounds, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934) (the "New York Giants"
baseball enterprise).
69. Hill v. Beach, 12 N.J. Eq. 31 (Ch. 1858). On a bill for an accounting, the corporate
entity was ignored and the shareholders were viewed as partners. Although it does not
appear that the interested associates were New Jersey citizens, the court apparently
believed that an enterprise such as this required a local charter, even though it might
have viewed otherwise a New York corporation formed to carry on an essentially New
York business but whose activities spilled over into New Jersey.
70. Empire Mills v. Alston Grocery Co., 15 S.W. 200, on rehearing, 15 S.W. 505
(Te.:. Ct. App. 1891).
71. In European law to this day such a feature of corporation law is apparently con-
sidered an essential safeguard against irresponsible ventures. The new Spanish corpora-
tion law requires full subscription of all shares and one-fourth payment before the corpora-
tion can be formed. Law of July 17, 1951, (Ley de R gJnen .itrldico de las Sociedades An6ni-
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seeking to finance and operate an exposition in St. Joseph, Missouri, formed a
Colorado corporation with an authorized capital stock of $1,000,000, of which
only $43,000 was ever paid in, the local court protected the corporation's
creditors by holding the incorporators to unlimited personal liability.7 2 The
result is sound, even if the court's reasoning that no principle of comity re-
quired the court to recognize the corporation as such proves too much. That
is, the result is sound so long as the Missouri subscription and payment pro-
visions are thought to reflect a strong protective policy.
A more modern variety of protective legislation, concerning the shareholder's
right to inspect corporate books, was involved in the case of Toklan Royalty
Corp. v. Tiffany.73 Here the Oklahoma court faced the question whether to
apply to a Delaware-chartered corporation the Delaware statute on the share-
holder's right to inspect corporate books, which required the shareholder to
allege and prove his "proper" motive, or the Oklahoma statute, which had
no such requirement. The court chose the Oklahoma lawv-principally, one
suspects, because of the pseudo-foreign character of the corporation. This
corporation, said the court, referring with approval to the terms "migratory"
and "tramp" corporations, "is not, strictly speaking, a foreign corporation with
respect to the question of examination and inspection of its books and records
by its stockholders."7 4 The court bolstered its opinion by reference to an
"equal treatment" provision for foreign corporations in the Oklahoma Consti-
tution 75 and by an overstated argument that the word "corporation" in local
corporation laws is meant, unless the contrary appears, to include foreign
corporations.7 6
nas), art. 8, BoLEn OFICIAL Aug. 6, 1951. French law makes the same requirement.
Law of July 24, 1867, arts. 1, 24 (under CODE DE ComsAnaRcE, art. 64). Italian law is
similar: CODICE CivLz art. 2329 (1942). So is German law: Law of Jan. 30, 1937
(Aktiengesetz) § 28(2), [1937] RE IcHSGSErZBLATr 1.107. See I MANUAL OF GEaIAN
LAW 240 (England 1950).
72. Cleaton v. Emery, 49 Mo. App. 345 (K.C. Ct. App. 1892). It should be noted
that this case is not necessarily inconsistent with State cx rel. Brown Contracting & Bldg.
Co. v. Cook, 181 Mo. 596, 80 S.W. 929 (1904), which allowed a pseudo-foreign corporation to
be admitted into the state even though it was allegedly formed to evade local law. See note 36
supra. In fact, although it made a feeble attempt to distinguish the Cleaton case on the
ground of noncompliance with Colorado law (to which the de facto doctrine would seem
to be a sufficient answer), the court in the later case seemed to approve of the Cleaton
decision.
The Cleaton case antedated the 1903 Missouri statute which recited that foreign corpor-
ations formed to evade Missouri law would, if admitted to do business in Missouri,
subject the shareholders to partnership liability. Mo. Laws of 1903, pp. 121, 122-23. The
Cook decision was after passage of the statute, but still sidestepped it. See note 36 supra
and accompanying text.
73. 193 Okla. 120, 141 P.2d 571 (1943).
74. Id. at 122, 141 P.2d at 573. It does not appear from the report, however, that
the shares of this "foreign" corporation were held predominantly or substantially by local
residents.
75. "No foreign corporation ... shall be relieved from coinpliance with any of the
requirements made of a similar domestic corporation .. " OKLA. CoNsT. art. IX, § 44.
76. A similar willingness to look into the "internal affairs" (corporate elections)
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Sometimes the local courts will not bother to question the foreignness of a
corporation, but simply indulge in an expansive construction of the local sub-
stantive law in order to apply it to essentially localized foreign corporations. 71
For instance, there is a New York statute making directors of foreign corpora-
tions doing business in New York liable under the provisions of the New York
Stock Corporation law, like directors of New York corporations, if they do
certain enumerated acts.78 The statute might have been construed to mean that
any liability of directors of foreign corporations imposed by the state of in-
corporation would be enforced in New York.70 But the court of appeals con-
strued it to subject the directors of a New Jersey corporation to the substantive
liability imposed by New York law ;80 and the corporation in question subse-
quently recovered from a director the amount of unlawful dividends paid
and to apply the provisions of local corporation statutes (prescribing the procedure for
judicial inquiry into an election) was displayed by an Idaho court dealing with an
Arizona corporation all of whose properties were in Idaho. Hunter v. Merger Mines
Corp., 67 Idaho 115, 170 P.2d 800 (1946). The court noted that the corporation's "sole
operation, for [the] purpose of working the property, is in Idaho," id. at 119, 170 P.2d
at 801, but again an "equal treatment" statute served as a make-weight: "Foreign cor-
porations.., shall be subject to the laws of the state applicable to like domestic corpora-
tions." IDAHO CoDE ANN. § 30-510 (1948).
77. For example, when faced with a foreign corporation whose principal place of
business was in Montana, a court held that the Montana statute imposing liability on
directors for failure to make certain annual filings was meant to apply to foreign cor-
porations. Nelson v. Bank of Fergus County, 157 Fed. 161 (8th Cir. 1907). The plaintiff
here was a local creditor. But the same statutd was held not so to apply in Stark Bros.
Nurseries & Orchards Co. v. Little, 257 Fed. 421 (7th Cir. 1919). In the latter case it
was only reported that the foreign corporation was "doing business" locally, but it is
generally known that the Stark nursery enterprise is essentially not a Montana enterprise.
Incidentally, the plaintiff was not in this case a local creditor.
78. N.Y. S'rccK CORP. LAW § 114, reads as follows:
"Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the officers, directors, and stock-
holders of a foreign stock corporation transacting business in this state, except
a moneyed or a railroad corporation, shall be liable under the provisions of this
chapter, in the same manner and to the same extent as the officers, directors, and
stockholders of a domestic corporation, for the making of
1. Unauthorized dividends;
2. Unlawful loans to stockholders;
3. False certificates, reports or public notices;
4. Illegal transfers of the stock and property of such corporations, when it is
insolvent or its insolvency is threatened.
"Such liabilities may be enforced in the courts of this state, in the same manner
as similar liabilities imposed by law upon the officers, directors and stockholders
of domestic corporations."
For the legislative history of the above-quoted statute, see Irving Trust Co. v. Mary-
land Cas. Co., 83 F.2d 168 (2d Cir. 1936); KEHL, CORPORATE DivzDnaims 307-08 (1941).
79. See German-American Coffee Co. v. Diehl, 167 App. Div. 928, 152 N.Y. Supp.
1113 (1st Dep't 1915), where the court below had sustained a demurrer to the complaint
against the directors on this interpretation and on the square authority of De Raismes
v. United States Lithograph Co., 161 App. Div. 781, 146 N.Y. Supp. 813 (1st Dep't 1914).
'0. German-American Coffee Co. v. Diehl, 216 N.Y. 57, 109 N.E. 875 (1915), revers-
inq 167 App. Div. 928, 152 N.Y. Supp. 1113 (1st Dep't 1915).
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during his term, even though under New Jersey law the cause of action did
not run to the corporation.8' Whether or not the court was influenced by the pre-
dominantly local flavor of the particular corporation it was dealing with,8 2 in
construing the statute it quite definitely had in mind the pseudo-foreign cor-
poration. 3
Again, one notes that some of the local statutes that are expressly made
applicable to foreign corporations in matters of what may be called internal
affairs seem to be invoked in full force only against predominantly localized
enterprises. Thus an Iowa statute that made applicable to foreign public
utility corporations certain sections of local Iowa corporation law relating to
the amount and kind of consideration required- to be received upon the issuance
of shares,8 4 was applied to a Delaware corporation with utility properties sole-
ly in Iowa, in State ex rel. Weede v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co.85 Even though
the corporation had certain attributes of the cosmopolite, in that much of its
financing apparently came from outside the state and some of its directors'
meetings were held in New York City and Chicago,88 the court emphasized
its essentially local character-perhaps not too difficult to establish in a busi-
ness with clearly localized land, plant and equipment and which locally pro-
duces a product all (or substantially all) of which is sold locally.87 It should
81. See German-American Coffee Co. v. O'Neil, 102 Misc. 165, 169 N.Y. Supp. 421
(Sup. Ct. 1918).
Under New Jersey law, unless the corporation is insolvent, the liability runs to the
stockholders, not to the corporation. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:8-19 (1939), Fleisher v. West
Jersey Securties Co., 84 N.J. Eq. 55, 92 Atl. 575 (Ch. 1914).
82. As to this, insufficient facts are reported. The opinion states that the corpora-
tion maintained its main business office in New York, there held all the regular and
"most" of the special meetings of the board of directors, and there "managed, directed
and conducted its business." German-American Coffee Co. v. Diehl, 216 N.Y. 57, 60, 109
N.E. 875 (1915). The corporation may have been only in low degree pseudo-foreign-
it may have been one of the many cosmopolite corporations with executive headquarters in
New York. The doctrine of the case seems later to have been applied to the latter type
of corporation. Irving Trust Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 83 F.2d 168 (2d Cir. 1936).
83. "In these days, when countless corporations, organized on paper in neighboring
states, live and move and have their being in New York, a sound public policy demands
that our Legislature be invested with this measure of control." Cardozo, J., in German-
American Coffee Co. v. Diehl, supra note 82, at 64, 109 N.E. at 877.
84. IowA CODE ANN. § 495.1 (1949). The statute was probably enacted in the belief
that overvaluation of securities has an influence on rate regulation.
85. 231 Iowa 784, 2 N.W.2d 372, supplemental opinion, 4 N.W.2d 869 (1942) (on
demurrer to complaint) ; State ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 239 Iowa 1298, 31 N.W.2d 853
(1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 918 (1949) (same case, on the merits).
86. These facts appear in later litigation involving some of the same parties. See Des
Moines Bank & Trust Co. v. George M. Bechtel & Co., 243 Iowa 1007, 51 N.W.2d 174
(1952).
87. "While it was, and is, in law a legal resident of Delaware, and has its technical
domicile there, its 'commercial' or 'economic' domicile is in Iowa. It was conceived in
Iowa, born in Delaware, and has lived its entire life in Iowa. . . . Its existence in
Delaware is an illusory mirage, more atmospheric than real. Under the circumstances,
it is, in actuality, more domestic than foreign." Bliss, C.J., in State ex rel. Weede v.
Iowa So. Util. Co., 231 Iowa 784, 807, 2 N.W.2d 372, 386 (1942).
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be noted that the Iowa Southern Utilities case involved the very "internal"
question whether new stock issued in exchange for old under a recapitalization
plan should be cancelled.8 s The court applied Iowa law to test the validity of
the shares, and was thus enabled to apply its own standard of fairness to the
plan, instead of the Delaware standard with its unconcern about fairness.89 It
may be that the occasion has never presented itself, but the fact remains that
the Iowa statute in question has never been applied to a foreign public utility
corporation whose main business is out of state.
The Iowa Southern Utilities case involved a statute specifically aimed at
foreign corporations, but it suggests the question whether a foreign-chartered
enterprise may be so thoroughly local that a rearrangement of shareholders'
rights in the enterprise is a matter of local concern, so that a court will apply
protective features of local law even without the aid of a statute making local
law applicable to the foreign corporation. For example, Nebraska in 1951
passed a statute 90 aimed at one of the most criticized aspects of modern cor-
porations-unfair recapitalization plans that manage nevertheless to corral
the necessary votes. This statute requires the plan to do more than present
a vote score card; the plan, if challenged, must be fair and equitable, to a
court's satisfaction. Obviously, some strongly felt policy led to this legislation.
Now, suppose that Nebraskans incorporate their Omaha department store in
Delaware and sell the shares, preferred and common, to local residents. On
petition by one of these preferred shareholders to enjoin a preferred-stripping
recapitalization, it is quite likely that the Nebraska court would require the
plan to measure up to Nebraska standards of fairness. We need not inquire
whether the hypothetical corporation was formed in Delaware for the very
purpose of evading this particular Nebraska law: it should make no
difference, although if that fact were shown the court could be expected to
mention it to make the decision look more incontrovertible. Indeed, such a
decision might be more logical than was the application of the local statute
in Iowa Southern Utilities-where, for all that appears, the prejudiced class of
shareholders may have consisted largely of non-residents.
88. The precise issue was whether the new common stock received under a recapitali-
zation plan by the insider who engineered the plan and who owned nearly all the old
common stock, should be cancelled. Under the recapitalization plan the several pre-
exiting valuable classes of preferred stock and the wholly worthless (as the court viewed
it) common stock all were eliminated by charter amendment and were replaced by a
single class of common stock, of which the old worthless common got over half a million
dollars' worth. State ex rel. Weede v. Iowa So. Util. Co., 231 Iowa 784, 2 N.W2d 372
(1942).
89. As to the Delaware attitude toward a "fairness" requirement, see Barrett v.
Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198, 203-05 (D. Del. 1944). Under Delaware law
all that is necessary to effectuate such a recapitalization is to follow the Delaware statute
and to muster the required votes, except for "fraud" and the rare case where "vested
rights" are impaired. See Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 Atl. 115 (Sup. Ct.
1936).
90. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-1,162 (Supp. 1953).
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STATUTES BEARING ON APPLICATION OF LOCAL LAW TO PSEUDO-FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS
On that most sensible of distinctions-differentiating between the real
foreign corporation and the out-and-out pseudo-foreign corporation-the state
statutes have been completely silent. Neither the many constitutional or statu-
tory provisions that explicitly or inferentially make local corporation law
applicable to all foreign corporations nor those ostensibly immunizing all
foreign corporations from local statutes offer any substantial guidance to the
courts in drawing that common-sense line.
"Equal Treatment" Statutes
There are constitutional provisions or statutes in more than half of our
states approximating locally active foreign corporations to local ones. Although
the state provisions vary, they can be roughly classified. The largest category
comprises those constitutional provisions or statutes that say, in one
way or another, that foreign corporations admitted to do business locally are
not to get better local treatment than domestic corporations. The commonest
provisions state that foreign corporations are admitted to do local business on
"no more favorable conditions" than domestic corporations; 91 or are to do
business subject to the same regulations, limitations and liabilities (or privi-
leges or powers) ;92 or shall exercise "no greater" privileges, powers, fran-
chises, etc.9 3 In addition, scattered provisions are found subjecting foreign
corporations doing local business "to all the provisions of the laws of this
state" ;94 or to "the provisions of this title [the corporation law], so far as the
91. ARiz. CONST. art. XIV, § 5; CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 15; Ky. CO;NST. § 202;
UTAH CONST. art. XII, § 6.
92. ARK. CONST. art. XII, § 11; Mic. STAT. ANN. C. 195, § 21.98 (Supp. 1953);
MI1N. STAT. ANN. § 303.09 (West 1946); MISS. CODE ANN. § 5341 (1942) (and "shall
... become to all intents and purposes a corporation of this state"); N.D. RLv. CoDE
§ 10-1712 (1943) (and "shall be subject to the laws of this state") ; S.D. CODE § 11.2101
(1939) (corporations, as well as officers and agents, are subject to "all the liabilities and
restrictions" imposed on domestic corporations of like character) ; TENN. CODE ANN. §
4127 (Williams 1934) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3091 (1949).
93. ARK. CONST. art. XII, § 11; D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-933a (Supp. 1951) ; FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 613.02 (Supp. 1954) ; HAwAii Rav. LAWS C. 157, § 8392 (1945) ; IDAHo CoNsr.
art. XI, § 10; ILL. Aim. STAT. c. 32, § 157-103 (Smith-Hurd 1954); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 25-302 (Burns 1948) ("to the same extent as if it had been organized undcr this
act....") ; KAN. G-N. STAT. § 17-505 (1949) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351-575 (Vernon 1952) ;
MONT. CoNsT. art. XV, § 11; MONT. Rav. CODES ANN. § 15-1709 (1947); N.M1. STAT.
ANN. § 51-10-1 (1953) ; OKLA. CONST. art. IX, § 44 (foreign corporation not to be "re-
lieved from compliance with any of the requirements made of a similar domestic corpora-
tion") ; OIZLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.199 (1953) ; ORE. R.xV. STAT. § 57-660 (1953);
VA. CONST. art. XII, § 163 (not "relieved from compliance with any of the requirements
made of a similar domestic corporation," if no resulting discrimination against the foreign
corporation) ; Wis. STAT. § 180.807 (1953).
94. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 23, § 85 (1952). Similar language is found in
a number of the provisions cited notes 92, 93 supra. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN., § 303,09
(West 1947) ; N.D. REN. CODE § 10-1712 (1943).
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same can be applied to foreign corporations" ;95 or subjecting their directors
or officers to certain liabilities similar to those that specific sections of local
law impose with respect to domestic corporations. 6
Some of these provisions would, if taken literally, automatically subject all
foreign-chartered corporations to local corporation law; others would similarly
apply if liberally construed; nearly all would so apply if the court strained
the interpretation a bit, as courts will from time to time. And yet it is incon-
ceivable that the Mississippi courts will literally apply to a real foreign cor-
poration the Mississippi statute that provides that once a foreign corporation
has complied with the requirements for admission to do business in the state
it "shall ... become to all intents and purposes a corporation of this state."'97
It seems equally unlikely that the broadest interpretation, reaching all corpora-
tions, real foreign or pseudo-foreign, will be given to the Michigan provision
that officers and directors of admitted foreign corporations "shall be subject to
all such requirements and duties as are imposed upon officers and directors of
domestic corporations organized under [the Michigan statute] ... and shall
be subject to the same penalties and liabilities for failure to perform any duties
imposed by such act as are the officers and directors of domestic corporations
organized thereunder."98 Yet it is quite conceivable that under such statutes
local corporation law would, on many occasions where the courts are faced
with protection of local interests, be applied to pseudo-foreign corporations.
Unfortunately the statutes are not so worded as to aid the court in making
the needed distinction between real and pseudo-foreign corporations. One
notes, for instance, that without discussion of such a distinction, under the "no
more favorable conditions" provision already mentioned,99 a local federal
court invalidated a mortgage on local property executed by the locally-operated
foreign corporation without a two-thirds vote of the shareholders. The basis
for the decision was that such a two-thirds requirement existed for domestic
corporations and hence that this foreign-chartered-but not clearly pseudo-
95. N.J. STAT. Aim. § 14:15-2 (1939); N.M. STAT. AN-. § 51-10-1 (1953).
96. MAss. Aux. LAws c. 181, § 14 (1955) (liability arising out of illegal dividends,
excessive indebtedness, etc.) ; id. § 17 (liability for false statements and reports) ; N.Y.
STocK CoRP. LAW § 114, quoted supra note 78.
97. Miss. CCDo Annz. § 5341 (1942). In Hamilton v. United Laundries Corp., 111
N.J. Eq. 78,161 Atl. 347 (Ch. 1932), the court refused to apply the local dividend statute in a
suit to enjoin a dividend by a foreign corporation notwithstanding the literal language of
the New Jersey statute, see text at note 95 supra. The extent of the local character of
the corporation does not appear; it does appear, however, that the plaintiff shareholder
was a non-resident.
98. MIcH. STAT. ANN. c. 195, § 21.94 (Supp. 1953). For example, the Michigan
General Corporation Act imposes a duty on directors not to pay dividends on common
stock out of unearned surplus, and makes them liable for dividends so paid. Id. §§ 21.22,
21.48. Most states permit dividends on common stock out of any surplus. It is unlikely
that the Michigan court (or, eventually, the United States Supreme Court) would subject
directors of a non-Michigan corporation to liability despite compliance with the law of
the state of incorporation simply because the corporation, though a real foreign one, has
been admitted to do some business in Michigan.
99. See text at note 91 supra.
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foreign corporation-should not be permitted more readily to make such a
mortgage. 0 0 Still, as we have seen, such equal treatment provisions have
provided the courts with a way of applying to foreign corporations seemingly
quite local in character certain provisions of local corporation law relating to
inspection of books and records, 1 1 and of challenging elections in such corpor-
ations. 10 2 And the background of the New York statute applying local law
imposing liability for unlawful dividends on directors of foreign corporations 103
is said to have been the desire to remove the "incentive for foreign organization
of domestic interests."' 0 4 Although on its face the statute purports to apply
to foreign corporations in general, and although the decisions do not make it
clear whether the courts will draw a line between real and pseudo-foreign
corporations, 10 5 such a background does suggest that the line should be
drawn.
"Hands-Off" Statutes
At the opposite extreme from the statutes just discussed there are statutory
provisions in a few states that at a literal first glance seem to put the
internal affairs of a foreign corporation beyond the reach of local law no matter
how completely local in character is the corporation. Such a provision, found
in several states, is to the effect that nothing in the local corporation act shall
be construed to authorize the local state "to regulate the organization or the
internal affairs of such [foreign] corporation."'10 6
100. Williams v. Gold Hill Mining Co., 96 Fed. 454 (N.D. Cal. 1899). It is by no
means clear that the West Virginia corporation in question, which was operating a Cali-
fornia gold mine, was predominantly local. Its executive headquarters appeared to be in
New York, and the mortgage bonds were payable there. It is interesting, and perhaps
significant, to discover that New York law at the time also required stockholders' two-
thirds vote. 1 GEN. LAws & OTHER GEN. STATUTES oF NEW YoRK 850 (Cumming &
Gilbert 1901).
But cf. Southern Sierras Power Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 205 Cal. 479, 271 Pac. 747
(1928), where local law requiring a local permit for the issuance of stock by a corpora-
tion was held not to apply to a foreign corporation. No mention was made of the "no
more favorable conditions" provisions. The court appeared to take an overly rigid "in-
ternal affairs" view.
101. Toklan Royalty Corp. v. Tiffany, 193 Okla. 120, 141 P.2d 571 (1943). See text at
notes 73-75 supra.
102. Hunter v. Merger Mines Corp., 67 Idaho 115, 170 P.2d 800 (1946). See note 76
supra.
103. See text at notes 78-81 supra.
104. Report on Investigations of Trusts, N.Y. S. Doc. No. 40, at 36 (1897), as quoted
in KEIL, CORo, TE DIVIDENDS 308, n. 37 (1941).
105. See in general KEHL, op. cit. supra note 104, at 307-15. See also discussion
supra pp. 143-55.
106. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 32, § 157.102 (Smith-Hurd 1954); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.570
(Vernon 1952) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-1001 (Purdon 1938). Since the Illinois
law is the model for the American Law Institute's Model Act, this Illinois provision may
spread to other states. See MoDEL BUSINESS CoRPOAToN ACT § 99 (1953 Draft).
Georgia has a distinctive new provision requiring that "all rights and obligations
as between the [foreign] corporation and its stockholders, or any class of them, and of the
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Such statutes by no means foreclose the question of applicability of local law
to foreign-chartered corporations, for the courts can and often do say, when
faced with a pseudo-foreign corporation: this is not really a foreign corpora-
tion at all; its foreignness is a fiction, not substance. The only way legislation
could so nail a court down as to leave it no room to look through form to
substance would be by phraseology so unequivocal as to be unpalatable to the
legislature. Courts can also reach the result by construing such statutes as
merely codifying the general principle that the law of the state of incorpora-
tion governs the organization and the internal affairs of a corporation, together
with the implicit exceptions to the principle. 10 7
The definition of the word "corporation" in local corporation statutes as
"a corporation formed under the law of this state" (or similar phraseology)
would seem to have little bearing on the problem. Such a definition only seeks
to point out a basic distinction in the local corporation law-between domestic
and foreign corporations generally. It should not be viewed as establishing
an automatic imperviousness to local law for any foreign corporation, no matter
how fictitious its foreignness. The pseudo-foreign corporation field is left,
under such a provision, to case law development.
One may venture to suggest, then, that in the case of the pseudo-foreign
corporation as distinguished from the real foreign corporation, such provisions
seemingly putting foreign corporations beyond local law should really be
no more the determinative factor than those numerous statutes previously dis-
cussed purporting to put foreign corporations under the local corporation law.
Under either sort of statute courts can and do make distinctions between real
and pseudo-foreign corporations in the application of local corporation law.
What is lacking is only a workable formula for making the distinction.
A SUGGESTED FORMULA FOR APPLYING LOCAL CORPORATION LAW TO
/ PSEUDO-FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
If the foregoing remarks are not too wide of the mark, the way seems open
for courts to develop a formula for holding pseudo-foreign corporations subject
to local corporation law.
A workable formula might start with the general proposition that matters of
organization, structure and internal affairs are to be governed by the law of
stockholders of any such corporation as between themselves, shall be determined by the
laws of the home state ...." GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1601 (Supp. 1954).
107. An apt analogy is shareholder's liability in the case of the "thin" or "inequitably
capitalized corporation." See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 302-03 (rev. ed. 1946) ; LA=,
SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 110-41 (1936); STEVENS, CORPORIATIONS
95-99 (2d ed. 1949). If, as against the entity rule, courts have been able to work out a
principle to the effect that the corporate entity may be disregarded "in any instance where
a recognition of it would produce unjust or undesirable consequences," id. at 95, it is hard
to believe that the shareholder organizing the inadequately capitalized corporation would
find that his troubles vanish under a general statutory or constitutional provision (of
which there are many) to the effect that shareholders shall not be liable for corporate
debts.
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the state of incorporation, even as to pseudo-foreign corporations. Then cer-
tain features of local corporation law would be applied on a selective basis.
The features so selected would be not those that are merely of the enabling or
blueprint variety, but those that seek to protect corporate creditors, parties
dealing with the corporation, shareholders or classes or divisions of share-
holders (including minority shareholders) ; and that in so doing reveal a strong
legislative policy. Application of this formula would involve assaying the local
policy, examining the local interests to be protected, and defining the pseudo-
foreign corporation.
Ascertaining the Vigor of Particular Local Policies
One good touchstone of the strength of the legislative policy expressed in a
particular protective feature is whether a domestic corporation could legally
circumvent the feature-for instance, by an appropriate clause in its charter
or by-laws. That is, if the same ends as this pseudo-foreign corporation is
reaching could be attained by a domestic corporation with a properly drafted
charter or by-laws, there is not much point in insisting on application of local
law to the foreign enterprise. Similarly, if the local corporation statutes them-
selves offer ready methods for circumventing other protective features of local
corporation law, there would seem to be little point in applying those protective
features even to a pseudo-foreign corporation.
Indeed, some of the local provisions embodying protective features could
well be viewed as of no great policy strength. In the author's view, for ex-
ample, such would be the occasionally found provision requiring a specified
amount of capital to be paid in before the corporation starts operating, and
imposing liability for all debts incurred before this is done.'08 Although cir-
cumstances would vary, one can conceive of the required $500 or $1,000 initial
capital, though presumably a feature for the protection of creditors, as being a
mere drop in the bucket. Again, in some states preferred stock redemption must
be made pro rata, rather than by lot. Arguably, pro rata redemption makes
for equal treatment and prevents manipulations; but those advantages would
seem to tip the scales only lightly, if at all, over redemption by lot, which has
many aspects of practicality to recommend it.
Perhaps a guide to the strength of the policy behind a particular protective
feature would be the seriousness or prevalence of the actual evils, and to a
lesser degree the potential evils, against which it is aimed. Testing it by this
standard we should say, for example, that the Nebraska fair-and-just statute
for recapitalizations represents a strong policy choice.1 9 So does the manda-
tory dividend provision of the new (although not yet in effect) North Carolina
Business Corporation Act," 0 which permits sizable shareholders under certain
108. See, e.g., MODEL BusiNEss CORPORATION ACT §§ 48(g), 43(e) (1953 Draft) to
the effect that a corporation is not to start business without at least $1,000 paid in for its
shares. Similar provisions, in varying amounts, are found in some 27 states.
109. See text at note 90 supra.
110. N.C. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 1371, § 50(i).
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circumstances to force dividend payments of one-third of annual net profits.
Even without a knowledge of the legislative history of such a provision we
can see clearly that it purports to cope with a serious minority stockholder
problem which arises frequently in close corporations-such corporations being
the prevailing pattern in North Carolina.
Local Interests and the Definition of Pseudo-Foreign
Not necessarily all local strong-policy protective features need be applied
to all pseudo-foreign corporations. Instead, they need be applied only when
the interests sought to be protected thereby are predominantly local interests.
This thought, in turn, helps to clarify something that hitherto has been left
largely undefined in this discussion: what is meant by a pseudo-foreign
corporation when it is not an out-and-out local enterprise, locally oper-
ating, locally managed and locally financed. A sharp eye for the predominantly
local interests would lead to using the term "pseudo-foreign corporation" as
merely a shorthand expression for summarizing the presence of those local
interests pertinent to the specific issue in question. Or, to put it another way,
the foreign corporation could be viewed as pseudo-foreign for one purpose, yet
not necessarily so for another.
Of course a primary characteristic of the pseudo-foreign corporation would
be that its main business activity takes place locally. If the main business is
elsewhere, even though the shareholders or creditors may all be local residents
they have undertaken to deal with an enterprise that is essentially an out-of-
state one, and it would seem a little highhanded to hold such an enterprise
to local corporation law. One might perhaps go a step further and concede
that a corporation may properly be chartered in any state where it has sub-
stantial business contacts, whereupon it should be recognized in other states
where it does business as a real foreign corporation, not a pseudo-foreign one.
But even leaving aside the cosmopolites and the rootless, there would still be
an open question as to many a Delaware corporation.
Given the predominantly local situs of the business, the ad hoc status of
the corporation as pseudo-foreign should be determined by the predominance
of the local interests among those to be protected. To illustrate: if most of
the shareholders (or maybe even most of the minority shareholders outside the
management group) are local residents, the local requirement for cumulative
voting might be applied at the request of the local shareholders. Again, if one
class of shares is held predominantly by local residents, the local requirement
of voting by classes on fundamental changes in the charter might govern. All
of which amounts to saying that for this purpose, the localized foreign corpora-
tion is pseudo-foreign. On the other hand, if local interests do not predomi-
nate, they might well be left to take their chances, along with the predominantly
foreign members of their class, with the provisions of the law of the state of
incorporation; and in such a case the corporation will not be considered
pseudo-foreign.
There is judicial support for such ad hoc treatment of the pseudo-foreign
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corporation. One recalls that in Toklan Royalty Corp. v. Tiffany,"' the Okla-
homa case applying the local book-inspection statute to a foreign corporation,
the court said that the corporation "is not, strictly speaking, a foreign corpora-
tion with respect to the question of examination and inspection of its books and
records."" 2 In other words, it might well have been treated as a foreign corpora-
tion for some other issue, again depending on the local state's concern with the
interest involved.
Application of the Local Law
Finally, if local law is to be applied, there remains the problem whether it
should displace the provisions of the law of the state of incorporation or be
superadded thereto. In most cases the local law, giving more protection than
the foreign one, would be superadded. But it would not be fair to pick out a
feature of each of the two laws on a specific matter-say, rights arising out
of unlawful dividends-and by accumulation thus subject directors or share-
holders to greater liability than is possible under the law of either state. In
such a case the local statute, if it is to be applied, should displace the foreign one.
And in the event that the foreign provision is more stringent than the local
one, presumably no protective purpose would be served by choosing the more
lenient local law.1' 3 That is, if the local enterprise wants, by the foreign
charter, to give even greater protection to creditor and shareholder interests,
the local state can hardly object.
It has been seen that a distinction between real and pseudo-foreign corpora-
tions for purposes of applying local law is made in practice without clear
judicial enunciation of the process by which it is made; and it has been shown
that a rational, effective formula could without difficulty be developed and ap-
plied by the courts. It remains to examine the constitutional aspects of the
suggested formula, and then to glance briefly at the way the problem is handled
in the civil law countries.
CONSTITUTIONAL AsPEcTs
Application to the pseudo-foreign corporation of the protective statutes that
the local state has formulated for its own corporations would seem to run into
111. 193 Okla. 120, 141 P.2d 571 (1943). See note 73 supra and accompanying tex:t.
112. Id. at 122, 141 P.2d at 573. (Emphasis added.)
113. We may illustrate by taking the Toklan Royalty case, see text at note 73 s.upra, in
hypothetical reverse. Suppose that Delaware had no "proper purpose" qualification to the
shareholders' right to inspect the corporation's books and that Oklahoma did have such a
requirement. Then, in a shareholder's suit in Oklahoma to inspect the books, the Okla-
homa court most likely would have made the traditional choice of the law of the state
of incorporation-unless, of course, the hypothesized Oklahoma policy against stockholders'
inspection as of right were so strong that a charter clause granting the right unqualifiedly
would have been invalid in a domestic corporation.
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no serious constitutional obstacle. Non-discriminatory local requirements im-
posed on foreign and domestic corporations alike, otherwise constitutional as
applied to domestic corporations, can constitutionally be applied to foreign
corporations."14 Thus, the Supreme Court has held that California's former
statute imposing liability to corporate creditors on the shareholders could
validly subject shareholders in foreign corporations doing business in Cali-
fornia to liability for corporate debts incurred in California."15 There seems
to be no reason to believe that features of local corporation law other than
superadded stockholder liability would run into any greater constitutional
difficulty, particularly where a pseudo-foreign corporation is involved. The
Court today would perhaps feel no need to resort to the fiction that the share-
holders had consented to California law by taking shares in a corporation
that they knew was to do business there."16 But such consent reasoning, if
applicable at all, would apply with even greater force to a pseudo-foreign
corporation than to a genuine foreign enterprise.
If, for instance, the corporation law of the local state were to adopt the
policy that all shares are entitled to one vote, no more, no less, the application
of this law and the consequent refusal to recognize the disfranchisement under
the foreign charter of a class of shares held predominantly by its citizens in a
corporation predominantly local in character would not amount, it is submitted,
to denial of due process. 7 Nor would it constitute failure to give full faith
and credit to the public acts of the state of incorporation,,"8 or impairment of
the obligation of contracts. 1 0 All of these challenges would have to rest essenti-
114. Indeed, the local state can exact, as the price for doing local business, that the
foreign corporation reincorporate as a domestic corporation and thereby subject itself
completely to local corporation law. Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 282 U.S. 440
(1931).
115. Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U.S. 221 (1914); Pinney v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 144
(1901).
116. In the cases cited in the preceding footnote the charters themselves revealed
that the corporations in question (one chartered in Colorado, the other in Arizona) were
to do business in California. But there is no reason why the shareholder's knowledge need
come from the charter. But cf. Towle v. Beistle, 97 Ind. App. 241, 186 N.E. 344 (1933),
(complaint insufficient because no allegation that the defendant shareholders knew of the
out-of-state operations).
117. For the use by the Supreme Court of the due process argument in reversing a
state court's application of local law, see Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine
Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 149-50 (1934) ; Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930).
See also Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field
of Conflict of Laws, 39 HAxv. L. Rzv. 533 (1926). But it would seem doubtful that the
local court's application of local corporation law, within the limits suggested in these pages,
would amount to an unwarrantable extension of the law of the forum beyond its proper
orbit (hence violative of due process), even under the "vested rights" theory of conflict
of laws. See Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
118. Ibid.
119. Even if the pseudo-foreign corporation had been admitted to do local business
before the local enactment of the hypothesized voting requirements, the local state's inter-
est in the matter under the assumed circumstances is so predominant as to bar a claim that
the enactment amounts to impairment of the obligation of contract, just as is the case of a
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ally upon the precarious claim that the local state has so little interest in the
matter that application of its law would be unreasonable. One recalls how
local law on matters fully as much within the "charter contract" was applied
to a foreign corporation in the Iowa Southern Utilities case. 12 0
Departure from the easy application of the corporation law of the state of
incorporation would, of course, eventually create some full faith and credit
problems which would have to be solved by the Supreme Court. So far, it does
not appear that the decisions of the Court compel the local state to
apply the law of the state of incorporation regardless of the issue involved
or of the fictitiousness of the foreign character of the corporation. True, one
finds in the Court's opinions time and again expressions to the effect that
membership in a corporation looks to and must be governed by the law of the
state granting the incorporation, 21 but the cases usually involve no conflict
among the policies of the states having legitimate interests to protect, or else
are cases where application of the law of incorporation was more essential to
the public interest than was the discomfort to local citizens resulting from
denial of local law.1 22 The most serious blow against the local state was the
closely divided decision in Order of United Commercial Travelers v. IVolfe,'2 .
which, whatever be its soundness as applied to the cosmopolite there involved'12
would be rather shocking if applied to a pseudo-foreign corporation.
None of the full faith and credit cases has involved the pseudo-foreign cor-
poration. Faced with such a corporation, especially with an out-and-out
domestic corporation. For the latter, the question would be set at rest by the usual
"reserve power" clause in state constitutions or statutes. Looker v. Maynard, 179 U.S.
46 (1900).
120. State ex rel. Weede v. Iowa So. Util. Co., 231 Iowa 784, 2 N.W.2d 372, supple-
mental opinion, 4 N.W.2d 869 (1942). See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
121. Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 624 (1947);
Modern Woodmen v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 551 (1925).
122. See Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935) (local state must recognize share-
holder's statutory liability imposed by state of incorporation) ; Modern Woodmen v. Mix-
er, 267 U.S. 544 (1925) (local court may not disregard by-laws of fraternal association
incorporated in another state); Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915) (local
state must defer to law of state where fraternal beneficiary association incorporated, and
cannot challenge an assessment valid under that law) ; Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S.
243 (1912) (local state must allow enforcement of additional shareholder liability imposed
by law of state of incorporation). But see Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, 314 U.S.
201 (1941) (local state may determine for itself whether local policyholders in foreign
mutual insurance company have undertaken liability for assessments upon their policies).
123. 331 U.S. 586 (1947). In this 5-to-4 decision the Court held ineffective the local
South Dakota statute which invalidated contractual time restrictions upon enforcement
of rights, as against the membership contract of a fraternal benefit society incorporated
in Ohio containing such a restriction, despite the fact that the claim was based on an
insurance certificate issued to a South Dakota resident pursuant to an application pre-
sented to the branch office in South Dakota.
124. The decision met with considerable criticism in legal periodicals. See Harper,
The Supreme Court and the Conflict of Laws, 47 COLUm. L. RPv. 883, 895-97 (1947) ;
Notes, 57 YAlE L.J. 139 (1947), 43 ILL. L. Ra,. 116 (1948), 21 So. CAu.ir. L. REv. 187
(1948), 15 U. Cni. L. Rv. 409 (1947), 33 VA. L. Rav. 767 (1947).
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pseudo-foreign corporation, the Supreme Court could not very well say
that the matter in question "is peculiarly within the regulatory power" of the
state of incorporation, "so much so that no other state can properly be said
to have any public policy thereon" ;125 nor, indeed, that the state of incorpora-
tion had the major concern in the issue presented. 12 6 The Supreme Court may
use the full faith and credit clause as a rationale by which to enforce upon the
state courts its view of the proper principle of conflict of laws, but it is difficult
to conceive that any theory of conflicts-be it the "vested rights" theory or
the "local law" theory or the "comity" theory 127--forces the local state court
to acknowledge the superior interest of, say, Delaware as the charter state, in
a fight among all local residents who are shareholders of a completely localized
corporation.
Nor does one easily foresee the occasion for a Delaware court to "find" that
the corporate enterprise in question is really Delawarian, so as to make a
Delaware judgment entitled to full faith and credit in the state where the
enterprise is actually localized, under some such "bootstrap doctrine" as has
developed in migratory divorce law.' 28 The situation in corporate contro-
versies is not in this respect analogous to divorce law; a Delaware judgment
or decree in a corporate controversy may rest, indeed, on the fact that the
corporation is a Delaware corporation, but it is unlikely to involve an express
or implied finding that the enterprise was "really domiciled" in Delaware.
Even if in the Supreme Court's review of the choice of law with respect to
foreign corporations a guiding principle is that some matters within the cor-
porate structure must be governed by a single law (where unreasonable con-
125. Van Devanter, J., in Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 260 (1912).
126. Nothing in the full faith and credit concept (nor in the due process concept)
requires blind adherence to a rigid rule of choice of law without regard to the major
interests in the situation on the part of the competing states. It would seem just as true
Of corporate matters, internal or not, as of a workmen's compensation act that:
"[Tlhe conflict is to be resolved, not by giving automatic effect to the full faith
and credit clause, compelling the courts of each state to subordinate its own statutes
to those of the other, but by appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdic-
tion, and turning the scale of decision according to their weight....
"[California's] interest is sufficient to justify its legislation and is greater than
that of Alaska, of which the employee was never a resident and to which he may
never return."
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547-50 (1935).
127. See STUMBERG, CoNFLic OF LAWS 6-17 (2d ed. 1951).
128. For a "good" evasive migratory divorce the parties must behave in proper legal
fashion: the defendant spouse must co-operate at least to the extent of entering an appear-
ance by attorney, or of letting himself be served in the divorcing state, whereupon the re-
sulting decree will be entitled to full faith and credit in other states, even if the parties
were not really domiciled in the divorcing state, since, under the bootstrap doctrine, the
decree itself establishes the jurisdictional fact of domicile in the divorcing state, which fact
is now res judicata, at least between the parties and their privies. Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S.
126 (1951).
1955]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
sequences would follow from lack of uniformity) ,129 still in the case of the
completely localized foreign corporation that single law could perfectly well
be that of the local state, except in the rare instance where this would not be just
or practical. To put an extreme, and unlikely, case, suppose that local law by
statute or by judicial decree compels the directors of a completely localized
pseudo-foreign corporation to pay a dividend that the law of the state of
incorporation forbids. It is submitted that any judgment against the directors
for paying unlawful dividends under the law of the state of incorporation
would not be enforceable, under the full faith and credit clause. The law
that must yield may, in appropriate circumstances, as well be that of the state
of incorporation as that of the local state. Of course, as the foreign corpora-
tions gradually shade off into cosmopolites, the constitutional right of any court
to apply a law other than that of the state of incorporation may vanish as re-
gards the area vaguely referred to as the internal affairs of a corporation.
A COMPARATIVE LAW VIEW
The problem under discussion is by no means unique to American law.
Europeans, and particularly the French, 30 have faced it for a long time. Much
of the French legal discussion has centered on the concept of the "nationality"
of a corporation,1 3' and many authorities propound the notion that the cor-
poration's nationality determines the "personal law" applicable to the corpora-
tion.1 32 Not all the authorities agree with this formula, 33 but regardless of
129. See Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 624 (1947) ;
Modern Woodmen v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 551 (1925); Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237
U.S. 531 (1915). See also Coleman, Corporate Dividends and the Conflict of Laws, 63
HARv. L. REv. 433, 460-65 (1950).
130. England apparently was the Delaware of the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury for French enterprises seeking to incorporate but to avoid the rigorous French law.
In one litigated case, it appears that an attempt was even made so to anglicize the Moulin
Rouge. Soci~t6 "The Moulin-Rouge Attractions, Ltd.," Tribunal Correctionnel de la
Seine, July 2, 1912, [1913] Dalloz Jurisprudence [hereinafter D.] II. 165. Promoters
particularly liked the English legislation for its lack of requirement of an official appraisal
of property transferred to the corporation for stock. They also liked the Anglo-Saxon
idea of "authorized" capital, whereby with little outlay they could represent that their
authorized capital was millions of francs-which, translated into French, apparently gave
the empty shell the aura of a great enterprise.
131. It has been said that few questions have given rise to so much legal literature.
LousSOUARPN, CONFLITS DE Lois E MNATIkRE DE SocisT s 80 (1949).
132. 1 COPPER RoYER, SocirLs ANoNYMES 532 (3d ed. 1925); 2 id. 19-31; 3 id.
147-49; 3 HOUPIN & BosvIEUX, SocIitr s 222-29 (6th ed. 1928); 2 LYox-CAEN & RE-
NAULT, TRAITL DE DIOIT COaI E.RCIAL 1019-36 (5th ed. 1929); 2 ROUSSEAU, SoClfrTLS
COmEImcALES 421-31 (5th ed. 1921) ; SU RviLLE, DROIT INTMNATIONAL Plivt 718-29 (7th
ed. 1925); Mazeaud, De la Nationclitg des Socigtis, 55 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL PRlVL [hereinafter CLUNET] 30 (France 1928). More recent discussion of the
main lines of reasoning may be found in LoussouAiN, op. cit. supra note 131, at 81-89.
133. Some writers would discard the concept of nationality completely with respect to
legal entities. Niboyet, Existe-t-il Vrainrent une Nationalit des Socigtis?, 22 REvuE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PRrVE 402 (France 1927). See also 1 NiBovar, DRorr INTERNATIONAL
PRIvP FRAN9AIS 88-89 (2d ed. 1947); 2 id. 362-68 (2d ed. 1951). Others would draw a
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whether the law governing the corporation was worked out through the con-
cept of "nationality" or that of "domicile" or by a more direct route avoiding
those overworked words, the determining factor in locating the corporation has
turned out to be the "social seat"'13 4 (e.g., le sige social, la sede arnninistrativa,
el donzicilio social, der Geschaftssitz), which eventually won out over its
nearest rival, the principal place of business (le centre d'exploitation).135
The concept of the social seat is an attempt to get at the place where the
"center"'136 of the corporate activities may be logically said to be-the brain
or nerve center, if one may resort to anthropomorphic language. Perhaps a
rough approximation, for our purposes, would be the "main office" or "execu-
tive headquarters," though these terms do not convey to Americans the im-
portance that Europeans attach to the shareholders' meeting (assemble
ginirale), which they think of as the chief organ of the corporation, and to
distinction between public and private law in the case of "nationality." Others suggest still
different systems. See LOuSSOUARN, Op. cit. supra note 131, at 80, 90-98. But in the end,
whether they work through "nationality," through "domicile" or through some other con-
cept, they all reach substantial agreement in picking the jurisdiction that supplies the
governing law. Id. at 98-102, 123-28.
134. 2 COPPER Rovan, op. cit. supra note 132, at 22-31; 3 id. 147; 3 HouriN & Bos-
vinux, op. cit. supra note 132, at 225 (collecting citations) ; 2 RoussEAu, op. cit. supra
note 132, at 427; SuRVILLE, op. cit. supra note 132, at 722. For a good discussion of the
emergence of the social seat as the test, see LOUSSOUARN, op. cit. supra note 131, at 123-27.
See list of countries that support this test in 2 RABEL, CONFLIct OF LAWS 33-35 (1947).
For an evaluation of the various tests, see Arminjon, NationalitM des Personnes
Morales, ser. II, vol. 4 REvuE Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL 381-441 (Belgium 1902). 2 LvoN-
CAEN & RENAULT, op. cit. supra note 132, 1027-28 incline toward the principal place of
business but concede that the founders may take their choice, in good faith, between that
and the social seat.
The Italian CODICE CIVILE art. 2505 (1942) provides that: "Companies formed abroad
having their administrative seat or the principal object of the enterprise in this country
are subject to all the provisions of Italian law, even as to the requisites for the validity
of the act of formation." (Emphasis added.)
135. World War I painfully showed that a concept of nationality determined by
the social seat was completely inadequate for determining whether corporations can enjoy
rights reserved for local nationals or escape restrictions applicable to foreigners or ene-
mies. Accordingly, for the latter purpose a "control" test was developed, according to
which the nationality of a corporation was determined by that of its control group. 2
NIno-Er, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVL FRA!xAIs 364 (2d ed. 1951) ; Note, Niboyet [1929]
Sirey Recucil G~n6ral [hereinafter S.] I. 121. As Niboyet points out, the single con-
cept of nationality is inadequate to cope with the utterly different problems of conflict
of laws and enjoyment of rights. For a good example of the latter, see Soci6t6 Reming-
ton Typewriter v. Kahn, Cour de cassation [hereinafter Cass.] (Ch. req.), May 12, 1931,
[1932] S. I. 57.
136. 2 COPPER RoYR, op. cit. supra note 132, at 23 (the brain of the corporation);
I id. 534 (its "organs of will" and "organs of exe'cution") ; 3 HouP iN & Bosvraux, op cit.
supra note 132, at 226 (where the "essential organs" and administrative works are found;
where operations are planned; where the results of the activities converge); 2 LYON-
CAEN & RENAULT, op. cit. supra note 132, at 1027 ("organs of direction") ; 2 RoussEAu,
op. cit. supra note 132, at 427 ("where direction is exercised and where corporate opera-
tions are decided") ; SuRvi.LE, op. cit. supra note 132, at 722 ("the center of the business;
"where the company's organs function").
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the place where that body's deliberations take place.'8 7 Despite the fact that
some nice questions may arise when the shareholders' meetings, directors'
meetings and corporate offices are spread over various jurisdictions,138 the
concept of the social seat seems not unworkable. It is the rare case indeed
when one cannot say where the executive headquarters are or where the
main office of an active corporation is, at least as between two states or countries.
Although there are doctrinal disagreements among continental legal authori-
ties, there is unanimity on one point: the place of incorporation does not ipso
facto determine the corporation's governing law.139 Indeed, any suggestion
137. The text writers almost invariably mention the holding of shareholders' meetings
as one of the earmarks of the social seat. See any of the writers cited in note 132 supra.
To an American, accustomed to seeing many corporations hold their shareholders' meetings
at some place in the state of incorporation that has no real business significance, and
accustomed also to viewing shareholders' meetings as simply occasions to put a formal
stamp of approval on what management wants to do, the European's concern with the
"general assembly" seems somewhat unrealistic. However, these European "assemblies"
of shareholders are, in theory at least, powerful organs (for example, in theory they
determine the dividend policy) ; and while proxy voting is possible and not uncommon,
the rubber stamp action of the shareholders is not so apparent as it is under the American
system of management-prepared proxies mailed to the shareholders of record, which in
effect makes management the agent of the shareholders to vote the latter's shares. This
feature of voting by proxy is little used in Europe, according to my observation at a
number of shareholders' meetings.
138. See LouSSOUARN, op. cit. supra note 131, at 131. In Chandora v. Fondateurs et
Administrateurs de la Banque Europ~ene, Tribunal Correctionnel de la Seine, Feb. 10, 1881, 8
CLUNET 158 (France 1881), the bank was incorporated in Belgium, the majority of the
shares were held by French nationals, and its administrative seat (sige admunistratif) was
in France. Shareholders' meetings and directors' meetings were always held in Belgium,
where it also had a "considerable number" of employees, and it employed a substantial part
of its capital in Belgian industries. Its securities were "issued" in both Belgium and
France. Held, the corporation is governed by Belgian law, for that is the place of its
social seat (si~ge social).
139. To show the unequivocal emphasis with which the point is made in the treatises,
a few excerpts (translation ours), will suffice:
"[I~t would permit the most notorious frauds, since a quick trip to London or Guernsey
would suffice to fix the company's nationality. . . . Nationality would thus depend on
the founder's arbitrary will, and this is the very danger that case law . . .has sought to
avoid." 2 COPPER Rova, op. cit. supra note 132, at 21.
"Nationality cannot depend on the will of the founders. . . . Otherwise, it would be
too easy for the founders to evade the laws that they deem too severe. . . . For the
same reason the nationality of a company cannot depend, lure soli, on the country where
... the formalities or organization were accomplished." 3 HoUPIN & BosvIEux, op. cit.
supra note 132, at 223-24.
"French case-law has never viewed the place of formation of the corporation as the
determinative element serving as a base for the applicable law. . . . Since the foundcrs
would be able to form their corporation in any country they choose, the situation would
be exactly as if one applied the rule of autonomy [i.e., let the incorporators arbitrarily
choose the law for the corporation]." LoussovAsR, op. cit. supra note 131, at 54, 51.
"One cannot permit the founders ... to decide at their pleasure whether the company
they are forming shall be French or foreign. Otherwise, the founders could take the
company out from under the provisions of the [French corporation] laws. These laws
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that it should is generally dismissed quite summarily.140 Of course, the place
of incorporation may well, and usually does, coincide with either the social
seat or some other acceptable business connection, and accordingly the law
of the chartering state may be the applicable law by coincidence. But to permit
the place of incorporation, per se, to furnish the law which is to govern a
corporation that is by the local test an essentially local enterprise, would be
simply to allow the founders to determine whether they wish to abide by local
law or not.141 What then would be the use of embodying policy choices in the
state's corporation law if that law can be so easily evaded ?142 The attempt to
bring the corporation's affairs, internal or other, under the law of the wrong
state is viewed as a "fraud upon the law" or just plain "fraud," even though
no subjective intent to evade anything or to defraud anybody is proved. 14  So
if the social seat (or whatever the pertinent concept) is local, foreign incor-
poration does not make a corporation foreign for conflict of law purposes.
Naturally, to carry through, this system cannot permit the place stated in
the charter as being the social seat 144 to be conclusive, 145 since such a place
may be either completely false or else merely a paper office amounting to no
more than a mailing address. 146 Accordingly, the designated social seat must
be the real one. Furthermore, there seems to be a serious question under the
Continental system whether even a real social seat, established in the foreign
state of incorporation, when in all logic it ought to have been established locally,
would thereby become a dead letter, to be evaded whenever they seem inconvenient." 2
LyoN-CAEI & RENAULT, op. cit. supra note 132, at 1023-24.
"Nationality cannot be fixed by the laws of the place where the act of incorporation
took place since thereby the founders could ... elude the protective rules of the law. ..
SuRviLLE, op. cit. supra note 132, at 720.
140. See, for example, 3 Pic, DEs SocIftks COMMRCIALEs 660 (2d ed. 1926). Lous-
.ouarn points out that, unlike corporations, simple contract associations, like associations
en participation, might well be governed by the principle of autonomy (free choice), and
he cites supporting case law. LoussoUARN, op. cit. supra note 131, at 47, 50.
141. See note 139 supra.
142. See LoussOUARN, op. cit. supra note 131, at 41.
143. 2 COPPER ROYER, op. cit. supra note 132, at 24; 2 RoussEAu, op. cit. supra note
132, at 425; SURVILLE, op. cit. supra note 132, at 722-23. Such a case of "fraud" without
subjective intent might arise with a fictitious social seat. 5 NIBoYFT, op. cit. supra note 133,
at 589 (1st ed. 1948).
144. European law requires designation of the social seat somewhere in the documents
relating to the corporate organization or statutory publication. France, Law of July 24,
1867, art. 56 (under CoD DE CommERcE, art. 64) ; Italy, CODICE CIVaLE art. 2328 (1942) ;
Spain, Law of July 17, 1951 (Ley de Regimen Juridico de las Sociedades Anonimas) art.
11 (domicilio social) BOLETIN OFiclAL, Aug. 6, 1951. Compare our frequently fictitious
charter statements locating the "principal office" or "principal place of business" or
"registered office."
145. 2 LYON-CAEN & RENAULT, op. cit. supra note 132, at 1029; 3 Pic, op. cit. supra
note 140, at 665; 2 RoussEAu, op. cit. supra note 132, at 430.
146. The example almost invariably given by these authors (and found in the French
cases) is the fictitious English office of a corporation formed under English law. The
office in London of the house of Acton Dodds was, apparently, a domiciliary haven for
many outside corporations. See [1924] JOURNAL DES SociTts 132, 134.
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will succeed in making the corporation a foreign one.147 Thus, suppose an
enterprise otherwise thoroughly Continental were to incorporate in England,
adopting articles requiring all shareholders' and directors' meetings to be held
in England, and were scrupulously to adhere to those requirements. Would
the Continental court, notwithstanding the Continental tradition of attaching
importance to the place of those meetings as establishing the social seat, con-
sider this an English corporation, to be governed by English law? Perhaps
the case put would still give the local court a chance to wriggle out by finding
the real social seat to be at the business offices ;148 so let us suppose that the pro-
moters even go to the trouble of having the main office in England, which might
not be too awkward in some businesses. Would that clinch the English national-
ity of the corporation even though England or Englishmen have no other sub-
stantial business contact with the enterprise? Despite an occasional voice in
the affirmative, 149 most writers express the contrary opinion, affirming that
the social seat must be not only real but also serious-meaning, apparently, that
its fixation must respond to a serious business reason, not merely the desire to
escape local law. 150 Case law seems to be in accord with this preponderant
view.151 In one respect, however, case law appears to be more liberal than
147. 2 COPPER RovE, op. cit. supra note 132, at 25; SURVILLE, op. cit. supra note 132,
at 722-23. See also 2 ROUSSEAU, op. cit. supra note 132, at 425.
148. See Benoist, Syn. de la Socidt6 Joltaia-Rieka v. Schwob, Cour de Paris, March
23, 1909, [1909] S. II. 183, [1909] JOURNAL DES SocirTts 268 (the "true center of
initiative" of corporation organized under Belgian law to operate mines in Russia held to
be in France). See also Syndicat de The Huelva Central Copper Mining Co. v. Delzens,
Tribunal de Commerce de la Seine, June 29, 1910, [1911] JOURNAL DES Soci i s 371,
where the court played up the place of "administration" where books and accounts were
kept and "action" took place.
149. 2 RABEL, op. cit. supra note 134, at 44-45; Arminjon, supra note 134, at 381, 408-
16; Travers, La Nationalit6 des Socijt~s Commerciales, 33 RECUEIL DES COURS pt. III,
70-73 (1930). Their view is that such a social seat is the real one, regardless of the
motives for establishing it at that place; no fraud is involved, for it is not a case of making
something look like what it is not. But, while denying any "fraud on the law," Arminjon
distinguishes "fraud on the rights of third parties," which rights he would protect against
evasive choice of law. See 1 ARMINJON, DROIT INTERNATIONAL 270-73 (3d ed. 1947).
150. 1 CoPa ROYER, op. cit. supra note 132, at 534; 2 id. at 25-31; 3 HouiN &
Bouvimux, op. cit. supra note 132, at 226-27; 2 LvoN-CAEN & RENAULT, op. cit. supra note
132, at 1029; 3 Pic. op. cit. supra note 140, at 665-66; 2 ROUSSEAU, op. cit. si'pra note 132,
at 435; SuRviLLE, op. cit. supra note 132, at 722-24.
Even Demogue, who favors a wide freedom of choice, is in accord. See his note in
[1908] S. II. 177, 179. See LousSOUARN, op. cit. supra note 131, at 133-35, who points
out, agreeing with Niboyet, that the situation under discussion presents the true case of
"fraud on the law."
151. Cases squarely on the point are rare. See, however, Benoist, Syn. de la Socid t
Joltaia-Rieka v. Schwob, Cour de Paris, March 23, 1909, [1909] S. II. 183, [1909]
JOURNAL DES SocrfTes 268; Mythou v. Soci6t6 des Accumulateurs, Tribunal de Commerce
Seine, May 26, 1909, [1910] JOURNAL DES SocItTts 239; Comptoir des Caoutchoucs de
Padong v. Enregistr., Cass., July 17, 1935, [1935] S. I. 41 (in part, the court found
that the transfer of the social seat from Paris to Saigon was fictitious; but the court also
mentioned the lack of any serious business tie of the company with Indo-China, since its
physical operations were in Sumatra).
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some of the writers, for it apparently permits the social seat to be established
in any place with which there are business or personal ties, thereby allowing
in many cases a considerable freedom of choice.1 -2 Logically this view could
lead to the reasonable position that once a substantial business reason exists
for incorporating in a particular jurisdiction, the corporation should be gov-
erned by the law of the place of incorporation, wherever the social seat maybe.103
Once the local Continental court considers the corporation to be really
local, though incorporated abroad, it will apply local law even to determine
the validity of the enterprise's incorporation and activities. Not only are directors
and officers subjected to the civil and criminal penalties of the local corporation
law, but a pronouncement of "nullity" may be made by the local court 154 for
non-compliance with local law, whatever would be the attitude of the courts of
the state of incorporation. 15 Or if to treat the corporation as a nullity is viewed
as too strong a sanction (as in some countries), the corporation may be treated
as a defectively formed corporation,ES which may result in unlimited liability
at least for those who act for the corporation. 157
Perhaps Continental law goes a good deal farther than would be practicable
for the United States with its numerous competing jurisdictions; and it would
be no help to import the doctrinal disputes in which the European authorities
have become embroiled. Still, in at least one important respect Continental
152. See Enregistrement v. Soci6t6 du D1barcadre de Cadix, Cass., (Ch. civ.), June
20, 1870, [1870] D. I. 416 (organized in France, owned and managed by French nationals,
operating docks in Spain; held, French, and so subject to certain French taxes) ; Soci6t6
West Canadian Collieries v. Vanverts, Tribunal Civil de Lille, May 21, 1908, [1910] D. II.
41, [1908] S. II. 177, noted by Demogue.
See also Syndicat de Socit Huelva Copper Mining Co. v. Ladouce, Cass. (Ch. req.),
July 6, 1914, [1917] JOURNAL DES Socif Trs 78, where the corporation was formed in Eng-
land with "social seat" in England (not explained), by Englishmen (whether mere dummy
subscriber-incorporators or not does not appear) with the greater part of the shares going
to Portuguese interests, to operate mines in Spain. Most of the shares were traded in
the French market; eventually French directors were elected, directors' meetings were
held thereafter mostly in France, and business offices were transferred to France. Held,
corporation remains English. No real discussion of degree of original or later English
interests.
153. See Note, Demogue, [1908] S. II. 177.
154. Of the many cases cited by the writers above mentioned, the following may be
view'ed as typical: Soci-t6 Dite Const. Ltd. v. Brown, Cass. (Ch. civ.), Dec. 22, 1896, 24
CLUNEr 364 (France 1897) (nullity) ; Weber v. Soci6t6 Gtn6rale Anglaise et Frangaise,
Tribunal Commercial de Nancy, Feb. 18, 1907, 24 CLUNET 765 (France 1907) (civil liabili-
ty) ; Tribunal Correctionnel de la Seine, Oct. 25, 1943, [1944] S. [Index] p. 60 (violation of
penal law; defendants therefore ineligible under French law to be directors of this cor-
poration, which was French in reality though incorporated abroad) ; Siguier v. Fondateurs
de la Banque de Marseille, Ltd., Tribunal Correctionnel de Marseille, Dec. 31, 1909, [1911]
JOURNAL DES SociLTs 456 (criminal liability of founders and directors, with references
also to civil remedies and to nullification of the corporation).
155. See Caro & Cie v. Soci6t6 Franco-Belge de Panification Int~grale, Tribunal de
Commerce de Bruxclles, March 2, 1901, 29 CLUNET 883 and note (France 1902).
156. See HEMARD, NULLITAS DE Secilfrs 456 (1926).
157. Id. at 839.
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doctrine is more penetrating than ours: it invariably looks beyond the mere
shell of formal incorporation to the core of business reality.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In the light of the foregoing discussion, the following summarizations and
conclusions are submitted:
1. The proposition that all you have to do to escape "undesirable" features
of local corporation law is to incorporate in another state having no such
features is of questionable validity.
2. No fundamental principle of conflict of laws requires the forum to apply
only the law of the state of incorporation to a pseudo-foreign corporation, even
in matters relating to internal affairs.
3. The judicial decisions purporting to look to the chartering state for the
law applicable to a foreign corporation do not by their actual holdings preclude
the application of local corporation law to a pseudo-foreign corporation in a
proper case.
4. Such decisions do, however, often contain unnecessarily broad state-
ments to the general effect that the law of the chartering state governs internal
matters.
5. Contrariwise, there are numerous decisions that, regardless of their
actual holdings, create a body of judicial language to the effect that the foreign-
ness, by virtue merely of outside incorporation, of a basically local enterprise is
a pure fiction.' 58
6. The conflicting verbal patterns indicated above make it possible for a
court to apply local law in a proper case (or, conversely, charter-state law in a
proper case) and to support such application by respectable authority.
7. Local corporation law should not be applied "in bulk" to a foreign
corporation, despite the fact that it is merely a pseudo-foreign corporation;
rather, only special features of local corporation law are to be applied, on a
selective basis.
8. A proper case for such selective application is where there are protective
features in local law reflecting a strong public policy; the interests sought to
be protected by such features are, in the particular case, predominantly (or,
perhaps, substantially) those of local residents; and the foreign corporation is
carrying on its principal business activities locally.
158. The student of corporation law is reminded of the verbal barrage that makes it
so easy for a court to disregard the corporate entity (in a "proper" case) : alter ego,
buffer, blind, cloak, cover, delusion, dummy, mere fiction, mere form, mere formality,
illusory mirage, screen, sham, simulacrum, subterfuge, tool. Once a euphonious verbal
framework is handy, one need not be surprised to see a court use it when it is convinced
that here is a proper case for looking beiind corporate forms. Certainly the conflicts rule
that purports to look to the chartering state for the governing law of a corporation is no
more sacred than the doctrine of corporate personality.
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9. The application of local law should not require proof that the corpora-
tion in question, otherwise basically local, was chartered outside for the very
purpose of evading local law. Such proof, however, could be the clinching
factor.
10. No principle of constitutional law requires the forum to apply to a
pseudo-foreign corporation the law of the chartering state irrespective of the
"governmental interests" of each jurisdiction.
11. It is interesting to note that other legal systems have long rejected
the notion that the law of the chartering state automatically governs. Instead,
there must be compliance with the law of the place where the corporation has
its "social seat."
Perhaps, after all, the soundest policy to follow in incorporating a "local"
enterprise is: incorporate at home.
